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NOTES
Palestinian Private Property Rights in
Israel and the Occupied Territories
ABSTRACT

As the birth pangs of an emerging Palestinianstate rage
on, one question bars settlement, reconciliation,and peace: who
is entitled to the land? On a macrocosmic level, this question
has and will be answered through diplomatic negotiations,
political pressure, and violence. The microcosmic question of
the dispositionof private property, however, must be taken into
consideration before any lasting peace agreement can be
reached.
The rights and interests of Palestinianrefugees and Israeli
settlers with respect to the land they have an interest in must be
balanced with national needs for territorial continuity and
peace. By tracing the transfer of private land from Arabs to
Jews in the past 100 years, and by examining the law governing
occupied territories, current treaties, and humanitarian law,
one can suggest where title should rest.
This note argues that in most cases Palestinians have
superior rights to land taken from them since the birth of Israel.
Simply giving this land back to Palestinians,however, is not a
viable option because it would cast serious doubt on the
legitimacy of the state of Israel. Instead, Palestinians with
property rights should be compensated for their property and for
the inability to exercise their right to return.
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I. INTRODUCTION
[Private property] is one of the most fundamental institutions of
mankind and there is no workable substitute for it. It is the perennial
antagonist of centralized power. Without private property there can be

no prosperity, no peace and no freedom. And justice itself will be a
haphazard and occasional thing. Private property is "the guardian of
every other right," as the 18th century Virginian Arthur Lee said.1

Land ownership is and has always been the key issue in the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Discussion and disputes over land
usually take place on the macrocosmic level of national territory and
borders. Exacerbating the Middle East conflict, the Holy Land 2 has
been prized above all others for thousands of years because of its
historical and religious significance.
The specific issue of
Palestinian's private property rights in Israel and the occupied
territories, however, is critical to a lasting solution to the conflict in
the Middle East. 3 Many feel that this issue is insurmountable and
4
continually threatens to destroy the peace process.
A nation is ultimately made up of individuals, so perhaps private
land ownership is the microcosmic embodiment of the entire
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. As Eyal Benvenisti states:

1.
Tom Bethell, The Millennium That Was: Property. Prosperity and 1,000
Years of Lessons, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1999, 1999 WL 3092879.
2.
Since the very name of the general territory in question, be it -Israel" or
"Palestine," is a disputed issue, at many points I will refer to it as the "Holy Land."

because of its importance to the world's three large monotheistic religions: Judaism,
Islam, and Christianity.
3.
Tracy Wilkinson, Toughest Phase of Mideast Peace Talks Underway. LA.

TIMES, September 14, 1999, at Al.
4.

Id. Many doubt that a solution can be found. Wilkinson %%rites: "lain

opinion poll released this week and conducted by the Nablus, West Bank.based Center
for Palestinian Research and Studies found that despite overwhelming support for the
peace process, more than half of those polled--55.2,&--believed a solution 'acceptable to
both parties' cannot be found." Id.
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The private claim to repossess a plot of land is immediately translated
into a communal right to return, a right whose implementation may
bring about far-reaching social and political repercussions. Therefore,
those private claims raise one of the major stumbling blocks to Israeli5
Palestinian reconciliation.

Many Palestinians displaced for up to fifty years still hold title
certificates to homes where Israelis have put up their book shelves,
planted gardens and raised their children. The breakdown of the
peace process, the eruption of war-like violence, and the many lives
lost in the past few months evidence the near impossibility of
formulating a final settlement plan. This paper does not attempt to
address the issue of borders or answer hard questions such as the
status of Jerusalem. It simply suggests that because private property
was taken from individuals, a successful settlement must involve
individuals.
This paper will analyze the Palestinians' legal and equitable
claims to private property in Israel and suggest a property settlement
that can best accommodate both parties. Part II of this note will give
background history of the Holy Land leading up to the present, with
special emphasis on the displacement or transfer of populations
within the region and the reasons behind these movements. Part III
will explain the various laws that can and should govern refugees in
an occupied territory. Finally, Part IV will apply this law to the
historical facts and present considerations in an effort to reach a
workable solution.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
It is difficult to understand the complexity of the PalestinianIsraeli conflict without at least a rudimentary understanding of the
history of the region. This sketch outline is meant to frame the
current dispute over private land ownership. Special attention is
given to the questions of who the Palestinians are, who the Israelis
are, and what demographic and land ownership shifts have taken
place in the Holy Land in the past one hundred years.
A. The Ottoman Empire's 500 Years of Control Over the Holy Land
Numerous rulers have controlled the Holy Land in the past three
thousand years. 6 For the purpose of this discussion, modern history

5.

Eyal Benvenisti & Eyal Zamir, Private Claims to Property Rights in the

FutureIsraeli-PalestinianSettlement, 89 AM. J. INT'L. L. 295, 295 (1995).
6.
Dominion over the Holy Land has passed from these groups: Jews,
Babylonians, Persians, Romans, Jews, Romans, the Byzantine Empire, and finally the
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begins almost 500 years ago when the Ottoman Empire took
dominion of the Holy Land. 7 The Ottoman Turks controlled the Holy
Land from 1517 to 1917.8 Their Empire, ruled from what is now
Turkey, extended from the Balkans to Vienna, through most of the
Middle East, and from Egypt to Algeria. 9
The Ottomans, as Muslims, believed that law was derived of
revelation from God.10 The entire Muslim system of law is believed to
be of divine origin.'
Non-Muslim members of Muslim states were
divided into two groups: (1) heathens and (2) Jews or Christians
(collectively known as "people of the book"). 12 The Sultan, or ruler of
the Ottoman Empire, granted special charters to the "people of the
book."' 3 Rights conferred in the charter depended on the importance
14
of the community.
By the nineteenth century, different regions within the Ottoman
Empire began noticing that their rulers were doing nothing to protect
them from the suppression of European colonial powers.' 5 With
European nationalism as a model, the people of these regions began
yearning for their own independent states.' 6 Naturally, this was a
17
strain on the Empire's unity.
World War I signaled the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The Allied
Forces promised Arab peoples sovereignty over their territory if they
assisted them in defeating the Central Powers.' 8 The Arabs formally
accepted this bargain in negotiations between Sherif Husain, Emir of
Mecca, 19 and Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner of

Ottoman Empire (listed chronologically). THE PERENNIAL DICTIONARY OF WORLD
RELIGIONS 379 (Keith Crim ed.,1981) [hereinafter WORLD RELIGIONS].
7.
Id.
8.
See EDOARDO VITTA, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN MATTERS OF PERSONAL STATUS
IN PALESTINE 1 (1947).
9.
WORLD RELIGIONS, supranote 6, at 355.

10.
VITrA, supra note 8, at 1. The Prophet Muhammad himself, founder of
Islam, largely dealt with legal issues and made law. Id. The Qur'an, the Muslim
"Bible," is both a religious and a legal text. Id.
11.
Id.
12.
Id. at 2.
13.

Id.

14.
15.

Id.
WORLD RELIGIONS, supranote 6, at 357.

16.
UNITED NATIONS, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN
PROBLEM PART I: 1917-1947 3 (1990).
17.
Id.
18.
Id. at 5.
19.
Id. Sherif Husain held the important status of the keeper of Islam's most
holy cities. Id.
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Egypt. 20 The British, however, dubiously
contended that Palestine
21
had been excluded from the agreement.
In 1916, when the fall of the Ottoman Empire was imminent,
negotiations began between Britain, France, Russia, and Italy to
divide up the Empire among the European colonial powers. 22 Since it
was home to important religious sites, the Allied powers attempted to
place Palestine under international control. 23 Despite this, the
League of Nations ultimately decided to place Palestine in the hands
of Great Britain under the Mandate system. In theory, the Mandate
was supposed to be a temporary and transitory phase to usher
24
Palestine into independent statehood.
B. The Zionist Movement into the Holy Land
As a result of increased anti-Semitism in the late nineteenth
25
century, Zionism emerged as a European-wide political movement.
Its purpose was to aid Jews in escaping persecution in Europe by
establishing a national homeland. 26 The first important leader of this
movement was Theodore Herzl, the editor of an influential newspaper
in Vienna. 27 Initially, Zionism was a relatively secular movement. 28
Early Zionists considered several sites, including Uganda, for the

20.
Id. Sherif demanded "independence of the Arab Countries," and McMahon
confirmed that "Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of
the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca." Id.
21.
UNITED NATIONS, supra note 16, at 6. The committee on the HusainMcMahon correspondences found that promises were made for Palestinian
independence. Id.
22.
Id. The resulting document was the Sykes-Picot agreement. Id. These
negotiations claimed to be a plan for the specific recognition of an "independent Arab
State," or "confederation of Arab states." Id. Some Arab Kingdoms, such as Saudi
Arabia and Yemen, were granted outright independence as national entities, while
others, ironically compromising the most sophisticated and culturally advanced
Muslim populations of the Middle East (i.e. Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and
Iran) were carved into spheres of influence under the League of Nations mandates.
WORLD RELIGIONS, supra note 6, at 357.
23.
UNITED NATIONS, supra note 16, at 3.
24.
Id.
25.
JOHN QUIGLEY, PALESTINE AND ISRAEL: A CHALLENGE TO JUSTICE 3 (1990).
Jews had been persecuted in Europe for hundreds of years. The French revolution
helped the Western European Jews, but the Eastern European Jews in Poland and
Russia were limited in what they could do for a living and where they could live. Id.
In 1881, Tsar Alexander III made the situation even worse for the Jews, denying them
the right to vote, be professionals, live in cities and more. Additionally, severe attacks
against Jews called pogroms took place in the late 19th century. Consequently, many
Jews immigrated. Most went to America, but some went to Palestine. Id.
26.
Id.
27.
Id. at 4.
28.
See id.
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Jewish State.2 9 Palestine, however, was ultimately Zionism's target
because of its historical ties to the Jewish people. 30
The acquisition of land in Palestine was essential to the Zionist

dream. 3 '

Zionist propaganda stated that Palestine was "a land

without people for a people without land."32 Some individuals bought
land for themselves, but a larger portion of the land was bought by a
fund set up for the purpose of acquiring land. 33 'The Fund" would
then lease the land to individual Jews, who were forbidden to
sublease or employ non-Jews. 34 Naturally, Arabs were displaced, but
Herzl believed that taking land and the expulsion of Arabs were
complementary aims if Zionism were to succeed in achieving its
35

primary goal.
The Zionist plan did not go unnoticed by the Arabs.

36

Unfortunately, the Ottomans instituted a land registration system in
the late nineteenth century that led to wealthy Turks gaining legal
37
title to land in Palestine through questionable means.
Consequently, the Arab family farmer who may have owned the land
for generations retained possession, but became a tenant of the
wealthy absentee owner.38 'The Fund" usually bought property from
the wealthy absentee owners, giving the farmer no choice but
dispossession. 39 Sometimes, Palestinian Arabs refused to leave their
land, so Turkish authorities would physically evict them at "The
40
Fund's" request.

29.
Id. at 6.
30.
Jews were displaced from Palestine in the second century c.e., and very few
Jews lived there until modern times. WORLD RELIGIONS, supra note 6, at 379.
31.
QUIGLEY, supra note 25, at 4.
32.
UNITED NATIONS, supranote 16, at 11.
33.
QUIGLEY, supra note 25, at 4-5. "The Fund" was created thorough an
international conglomeration of Jews wishing to see a Jewish Palestine. Id.
34.
Id. at 5. "The Fund" thought it could keep the land in Jewish hands
forever. Id.
35.
Id. Herzl said "We shall try to spirit the penniless population across the
border by procuring employment for it on the transit countries, while denying it any
employment in our own country.. . . Both the process of e.xpropriation and the
removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly." Id.
36.
QUIGLEY, supranote 25, at 6.
37.
Id. at 5-6.
[Iun the late nineteenth century Turkey had instituted a land registration
system that led to wealthy absentees gaining legal title to land, often by
questionable means. After this occurred, the family farmers continued in
possession-as tenants-and considered themselves to retain their customary
right to the land, although that was no longer legally the case.
Id. at 5.
38.
Id.
39.
Id. at 6.
40.
Id. It should also be noted that indigenous Arab Muslims and Arab Jews
alike opposed the immigration and land purchase of the European Jews. They formed
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When Herzl died in 1904, Chaim Weizmann took over the Zionist
movement. 4 1 Weizmann had a position in the British admiralty
during World War J.42 He tried to persuade a contact, Lord Balfour,
then British foreign secretary, that Britain should sponsor a Jewish
state in Palestine because the Jews could civilize the country and
guard the Suez Canal. 43 By 1917 Weizmann had convinced Balfour
to propose a policy statement 44 to the British cabinet supporting
Zionism. The statement was approved, and Balfour wrote a famous
letter to Lord Rothschild known as the Balfour Declaration, stating:
[Britain] viewed with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national
home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing
should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and
45
political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

Pursuant to the Balfour Declaration, the British government
made promises to both the Zionists and the Palestinian Arabs, sowing
the seeds of prolonged conflict in Palestine. 46 Zionists saw the
Balfour Declaration as a contract between Jews and Great Britain for
Palestine. 47 Three implications of the Balfour Declaration warrant
attention.
First, it ran contrary to the spirit of pledges for
independence given to Arabs both before and after the declaration
was issued. 48 Second, Palestine's fate was determined by unilaterally
consulting the Zionists, thus completely ignoring the rights and
interests of the native Palestinians. 49 Third, the British had no right
to dispose of Palestine because the declaration was made when the
land was still officially a part of the Ottoman Empire. 50
C. Rule Under the British Mandate 1917-1948
After World War I, President Wilson's "fourteen points" outlining
the peace agreement to be negotiated demonstrated his liberal anti-

committees to prevent this land purchase, and appealed to the Turks not to sell their
land. Id.
41.
QUIGLEY, supra note 25, at 7.
42.
Id.
43.
Id. at 8.
44.
Id. This statement was drafted by Weizmann and Lord Rothschild, the
head of the Zionist Federation of Britain. Id.
45.
Id.
46.
UNITED NATIONS, supra note 16, at 8.
47.
Id. at 17. The Declaration, however, also espoused criticism from Jews that
for various reasons opposed a Jewish State. Id.
48.
Id. at 19.
49.

Id.

50.

Id.
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colonial stand. 51 Accordingly, the mandate system was thought to be
a stepping stone between colonialism and the birth of the state.52
Turkey was forced to renounce its claim to the Ottoman Empire in
the Treaty of Sevres and the Treaty of Lausanne in 1920. 53 The
administration of Palestine, Transjordan, and Mesopotamia (Iraq)
4
was given to Great Britain in April of 1920.5

The Mandate for Palestine asked the World Zionist Organization
to create an agency to conduit the immigration and settlement of
Jews in Palestine.5 5 In the 1920s, however, Jews were only a small
fraction of the population in Palestine.5 6 To provide land for the new
settlers, 'The Fund" continued to purchase land, primarily from
absentee owners. 57 Although the British initially helped remove
Palestinians from land bought by 'The Fund," they eventually
recognized Arab displacement as a problem and passed an ordinance
that required the purchasers to compensate the evicted tenants.58
Naturally, tensions rose during this period, resulting in many
violent encounters between Jews and Palestinians.5 9 The Shaw
Commission, appointed to investigate these incidents, reported that
the conflict stemmed from the "two fold fear of the Arabs that by
Jewish immigration and land purchase they may be deprived of their
livelihood and in time pass under the political domination of the
Jews ' 60 The Commission also observed "an acceleration of a process
which results in the creation of a large discontented and landless

51.
UNITED NATIONS, supra note 16, at 20. Wilson stated: "The Turkish
portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but
the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an
undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous
development...." Id.
52.
Id. at 21. The theory was that territories under the "tutelage . . . of
advanced nations" formed "a sacred trust of civilization." Id. The territories were
classified A, B, and C depending on the amount of tutelage the League of Nations felt it
needed. Id.
53.
Id.
54.
UNITED NATIONS, supra note 16, at 22. All of the Mandated Territories
except Palestine became fully independent states. Id. On December 9. 1917, British
General Allen issued a proclamation placing Jerusalem and all the British occupied
territory in Palestine under martial law. VrITA, supra note 8, at 6. By October 1918
they had extended this rule to all of Palestine. Id.
55.
QUIGLEY, supra note 25, at 16.
The mandate document that "an
appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of
advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social
and other matters as may effect the establishment of the Jewish national home." Id.
56.
Id. at 12.
57.
Id. at 18. When tenant Arab farmers refused to leave the land, Jews
petitioned the British to remove them, which they did. Id.
58.
Id.
59.
QUIGLEY, supra note 25, at 18. In 1929, one conflict over access to
Jerusalem's Holy Places resulted in the death of 133 Jews. Id. at 19.
60.
Id.
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class," in addition to noting that "no further land [was] available
which [could] be occupied by new immigrants without displacing the
present population."' 61 The Shaw Commission recommended that
62
limits be placed on Zionist land purchases and immigration.
Regardless of the Shaw Commission's recommendations and
other similar committee recommendations, Britain allowed even
higher levels of immigration and land purchase.
The Jewish
population of Palestine doubled between 1931 and 1935.63 'The
Fund" purchased tracks of land in close proximity to create clusters
that it hoped could become a geographical nucleus for the impending
state. 64 The Jewish Agency called for by the mandate was becoming a
65
state within a state in Palestine.
By 1936, the Mandate System began to break down. 6 6 The Arabs
began to organize in both violent and non-violent groups aimed at
halting the immigration and land purchases by Jews. 67 Zionist
military groups like the Haganah and the terrorist Irgun group
emerged, raiding Arab villages, planting bombs, and causing civilian
68
deaths.
The British Peel Commission tasked with investigating the
escalating organized violence recommended partition into separate
Jewish and Arab States. 69 One problem with the proposed plan was
that 225,000 Arabs would have to move from Jewish-occupied lands,
but only 1250 Jews would have to move from Arab-occupied lands.7 0
The British rejected this recommendation in 1938 because they
thought it would be unfair to force such a plan upon the Palestinian
Arabs.7 1 Instead, in May 1939, the British announced that they
wanted a single independent state, within ten years, which would be
"governed in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests of
each community is safeguarded." 72 Accordingly, they limited Jewish

61.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
Id. at 20.
64.
QUIGLEY, supra note 25, at 22. In the 1930s "The Fund" bought a great
deal of land in Haifa, along the Jerusalem-Tel-Aviv road, Tel-Aviv, and along the
Galilee. They established stockade and watchtower settlements to facilitate the

establishment of a state. Id.
65.
Id.; see also supranote 44 and accompanying text.
66.
QUIGLEY, supra note 25, at 24. A British official described a "filthy tin-can
settlement where the evicted Arab peasants huddled under the orange trees." Id.
67.

Id. at 23.

68.

Id.

69.

Id. at 24.

70.

Id.

71.
72.

QUIGLEY, supra note 25, at 27.
Id.
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immigration. 73 As a result, the Jewish Agency began organizing an
74
army to fight the British.
In the wake of increased tension between Britain and the
Zionist, leader David Ben-Gurion realized that the Zionist cause must
now align with the United States. 75 During World War I, both Jews
and Arabs began stockpiling weapons. 76 When the war ended, the
77
Jewish Agency began a campaign to get Britain out of Palestine.
Frustrated with its inability to create peace, Britain announced that
it was leaving Palestine and turned the problem over to the United

Nations in April 1947.78
D. 1948: The Creationof the State of Israel
By 1947, Jews were over thirty percent of the population of
Palestine. 79 The Mandate System had failed by not creating an
independent Palestinian State, and instead pursuing a half-hearted
attempt at establishing a Jewish homeland.8 0 The U.N. General
Assembly gathered to discuss the fate of Palestine in April of 1947.81
A Special Committee was called to prepare a report on what should
be done with Palestine.82 After visiting Palestine they reported:
The Atmosphere in Palestine today is one of profound tension. In many
respects the country is living under a semi-military regime. In the
streets of Jerusalem and other key areas barbed wire defenses, road
blocks, machine gun posts and constant armored car patrols are routine
measures.

83

73.
Id. The British limited Jewish immigration to 75,000 per year for the next
five years, with allowed increases subject to the Arab community's approval. Soon
after the adoption of this policy, the Irgun bombed the Palestinian Broadcasting
Service and attacked the immigration office. Jewish attacks were also launched
because of what was perceived as an abandonment of the Zionist cause. Id.
74.
Id.
75.
QUIGLEY, supra note 25, at 29. Ben-Gurion went to the United States and
established a businessman's group that sent arms to the Haganah. Id.
76.
Id.
77.
Three Jewish military groups coordinated attacks on bridges, railways, and
British personnel. Id. at 31. This movement culminated with the bombing of the
British headquarters located in the King David Hotel in July of 1946. Id.
78.
Id.
79.
UNITED NATIONS, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN
PROBLEM PART II: 1947-1977 1 (1990) [hereinafter UNITED NATIONS II].
80.
Id. at 1. All other countries under the mandate system were now
independent. Id.
81.
Id. at 2.
82.
Id. at 3.
83.
Id. The Committee visited Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan and
some of the displaced persons camps in Europe filled with Holocaust survivors. LEX
TAKKENBERG, THE STATUS OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 11
(1998).
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The United Nations' majority proposal was a partition plan that
would create an independent Jewish State and an independent Arab
State. 84
Jerusalem would be placed under an International
Trusteeship System. 85 The proposal was passed on November 29,
1947.86 The Jewish Agency accepted the resolution despite some
dissatisfaction.8 7
The Arab population did not accept this plan
because they felt it violated the U.N. Charter, which states that the
United Nations grants people the right to decide their own destiny.
Although the United Nations intended to create an armed militia
to carry out its partition plan, increased violence caused this plan to
become impractical. 88 In the months before British withdrawal, the
Zionist movement realized a plan that was to occupy as much
territory as possible beyond the boundaries assigned to the Jewish
State. 89 Israel unilaterally declared its independence on May 14,
1948.90
On May 15th, the day the mandate ended, full-scale war broke
out.9 1 Military units from neighboring Arab states began crossing
into Palestine in the weeks before the end of the mandate. 92 They
were concerned about their own borders and the growing amount of
93
Palestinian refugees pouring into their countries.
By the spring of 1949 Israel had concluded individual armistice
agreements (not peace treaties) with Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan,
and Syria. 94 Israel retained the land it had taken by military force
with few adjustments. Israel held seventy-seven percent of Palestine,
which included everything except the Gaza Strip (which was to be
administered by Egypt) and the West Bank of the river Jordan (which
was to be administered by Jordan). 95 In March 1949 Israel submitted

84.
UNITED NATIONS II, supra note 79, at 15.
85.
Id. at 16.
86.
Id. at 29.
87.
TAKKENBERG, supra note 83, at 12.
88.
UNITED NATIONS II, supra note 79, at 30. In the first three months after
the partition plan was adopted the casualty toll was 869 dead and 1,909 injured. Id.
89.
Id.
90.
Id. at 44. Two Zionist lawyers said that the "international decision [of
partition] had preceded the emergence of the state and thus may be said to have been
its legal foundation." QUIGLEY, supra note 25, at 64.
91.
TAKKENBERG, supra note 83, at 12.
92.
Id.
93.
UNITED NATIONS II, supra note 79, at 46. In a cable to the United Nations
the Arab League declared that "in order to fill the vacuum created by the termination
of the Mandate and the failure to replace it by any legally constituted authority, the
Arab Governments found themselves compelled to intervene for the sole purpose of
restoring peace and security and establishing law and order in Palestine." Id.
94.
QUIGLEY, supra note 25, at 89.
95.
Id.
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an application for membership to the United Nations for the second
time, and was finally accepted as a member. 96
E. The Refugee Problem
1. Persons Displaced in 1948
No one is certain how many Palestinians were made refugees in
1948. Israeli officials say 520,000, an Arab spokesman says 900,000,7
and the U.N. Economic Survey Mission estimates about 726,000.9
Today, the number of Palestinian refugees registered with U.N. Relief
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) has grovn to 3.6
98
million.
The Palestinians and Israelis have two different versions of how
these people became refugees. The classic Palestinian position is that
the expulsion was part of a carefully crafted Israeli plan to drive the
Arabs from Palestine. 99 The classic Israeli position is that the
Palestinians were told to leave by their Arab leaders.1 00 Regardless,
it is clear that there were expulsions, 10 1 massacres, 10 2 and voluntary
evacuations of Palestinians in 1948.
Anecdotal evidence paints perhaps the best picture of what
happened. In Jerusalem on May 15, 1948, Haganah loudspeaker
vans warned the Arab population to leave.10 3 They said "take pity on
your wives and children and get out of this bloodbath ....

surrender

to us with your arms. No harm will come to you. Or get out by the
Jericho road, that is still open to you. If you stay you invite

96.

Id. As war raged on between Arabs and Jews, Israel continually applied to

the United Nations for membership but was rejected until 1949. Id. at 87.
97.
TAKKENBERG, supranote 83, at 18-19.
98.
Wilkinson, supranote 3, at Al. This number is partially due to population
growth. Id. World-wide, there are about 6.9 million Palestinians. TAKKENBERG, supra
note 83, at 20.
99.

Justus R. Weiner, The Palestinian Refugees' "Right to Return" and the

Peace Process, 20 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1997).
100. Id. at 22. A more complex theory is that in 1947, when hostilities
escalated, the Palestinian elite (lawyers, doctors, businessmen, and other
professionals) left as instructed by Arab leadership. Id. The absence of these
community leaders caused the collapse of the Palestinian political institution, and
because of fear and confusion, the remaining Palestinian masses also left Israel. Id. at
22-23.
101.
Id. at 24. Israeli historian Benny Morris has written extensively about
Israel's culpability in the creation of the refugee problem. He has written, for example,
about the expulsion of 60,000 Arab residents from Ramle and Lydda. Id. at 25.
102.
One such massacre was in the Arab village of Deir Yassin. Weiner, supra
note 99, at 16. The village was attached by the Irgun and Stern Israeli military groups
on April 9, 1984, and resulted in many civilian deaths. Id.
103.
QUIGLEY, supranote 25, at 82.

130

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 34:117

disaster."10 4
Edgar O'Balance, a historian of the war wrote:
"wherever the Israeli troops advanced into Arab country, the Arab
population was bulldozed out in front of them.'10 5 Avnery writes: "[it]
typically sufficed to fire a few shots in the direction of Arab villages to
see the inhabitance, who had not fought for generations, take
flight."'1 6 Fear tactics were also used to move the populations as
07
Israeli forces spread rumors about disease in Arab villages.'
To ensure that the populations would not return, the Israelis
often destroyed the empty houses.' 0 8 The Israeli government then
formalized a policy against destroying Arab houses, instead planting
land mines around the empty villages and bringing in Jews to settle
abandoned areas.10 9 By the end of 1949, half of the indigenous
Palestinian population, or about 750,000 people, were displaced into
neighboring countries.11 0 In response to the influx of these refugees,
the respective Arab governments sent about 500,000 Middle Eastern
Arab Jews to Israel."'
Like many people forced to leave their homes in times of war, the
displaced Palestinians expected to return shortly." 2 Despite intense
international pressure to repatriate the Palestinians, the Israeli
government decided to bar return. 113 The fragile new government
could not stomach the return of hundreds of thousands of openly
hostile Palestinians. 114 By mid-1949, the possibility of return became
virtually impossible. Developments contributing to this included:
The gradual destruction of the abandoned Arab villages, the cultivation
and/or destruction of Arab fields and the share-out of the Arab lands to
Jewish settlements, the establishment of new settlements on
abandoned lands and sites and the settlement of Jewish immigrants in
empty Arab housing in the countryside and in urban neighborhoods.
Taken together, they assured that the refugees would have nowhere,
115
and nothing to return to.

104.
105.

Id.
Id. at 82-83.

106.

Id. at 83.

107.

Id.

108.

Id. at 84.

109.
110.
111.
83, at 14.
112.
113.
114.
115.

QUIGLEY, supra note 25, at 83-84.
Id. at 86.
UNITED NATIONS II, supra note 79, at 33; see also TAKKENBERG, supra note
Id. at 16.
TAKKENBERG, supra note 83, at 14.
Id. at 17.
Id.
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2. Persons Displaced after 1967
The second major displacement was the result of the 1967 ArabIsraeli war, also known as the Six-Day War, during which Israel took
the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. 116 Nearly 177,500
refugees fled from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Jordan. 117
They were joined by 240,000 former residents of the West Bank or
Gaza Strip fleeing for the first time. 118 Palestinians within Israel's
pre-1967 borders represented a minority. After 1967, however, when
half a million Palestinians fled their homes, the 1.2 million
Palestinians that remained found themselves under Israeli control for
the first time.119
Power struggles and skirmishes erupted between the Jordanian
Army and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) because
such a large proportion of the Jordanian population was Palestinian.
20
The PLO was eventually forced to relocate to Lebanon.
Consequently, Lebanon became the focus of Middle Eastern conflict
121
in the mid-to-late 1970s and the early 1980s.
Additionally, many Palestinians became refugees for the first
time because of land takings used to build Jewish settlements in the
West Bank.122 This process began as early as 1967, but greatly
increased in the mid-to-late 70s. 123 By the late 80s, the Israeli

116.
Id.
117.
Id.
118.
Id.
119.
TAKKENBERG, supranote 83, at 41.
120.
Id. at 18.
121.
Id. at 17. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, Lebanon is also
demanding compensation for property taken in 1948, along with reparations for
aggression and suffering. Lebanon to Demand Compensation for Property Confiscated
by Israel, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, February 12, 2000. 2000 VL 2731986. From 1972
on, Israeli forces have attacked refugee camps along the Lebanese border in retaliation
against raids in its territory. TAKKENBERG, supra note 83, at 18. One reporter
describes a the life of a Palestinian refugee in Lebanon as follows:
Reaching home requires stepping over puddles that have spilled from gutters of
raw sewage. Water is drawn from communal taps and heated on an oil stove
for bathing. At 49, Qadi looks 60 as he sits hunched over on a mattress
cradling a 2-year-old, his emaciated face lighted by a candle during one of the
camp's frequent power outages.
Mark Matthews, Peace PlansBypass Refugees in Lebanon: Palestinians'Future Looks
Bleak No Matter How Talks Turn Out, BALT. SUN, Feb. 15, 2000 at Al. 2000 WL
4858653.
The Lebanese civil war lasted from 1976 to 1991, and resulted in the displacement
of over 100,000 Palestinians. TAKKENBERG, supra note 83, at 18.
122.
QUIGLEY, supra note 25, at 220.
123. Id. at 221.
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government took about forty percent of the West Bank. 12 4 These
takings will be discussed in greater detail in the Occupier's Law
section of this paper.
3. The Intifada
Until the events beginning in September 2000, the intifada
(uprising) was the last major conflict concerning refugees. 125 In
December of 1987, a demonstration in Gaza erupted into a riot
throughout the Gaza Strip and West Bank. 126 Stores closed in
resistance to occupation, committees formed to ensure basic needs,
and Palestinians dramatically cut their consumption of Israeli
products. 127 Palestinian workers inside Israel left their jobs to
protest.128 An underground leadership emerged directing people
through Arabic messages painted on walls in the middle of the
night. 129 Children began to throw stones, and consequently were
130
beaten and shot by Israeli soldiers.
The intifada was the result of living under occupation for over
twenty years, being deprived of any political role, having land taken
at a rate approaching total dispossession, destroyed economies, and
no hope for the younger generations. 131 Seeing small children being
shot to death on television shocked the world. The U.N. Human
Rights Commission declared Israel's behavior unlawful, and stated
that "the uprising of the Palestinian people against Israeli occupation
since December 8, 1987 is a form of legitimate resistance."'132

III. GOVERNING PRIVATE PROPERTY LAW
International law regarding dispossessed private property
owners will be discussed within three separate but overlapping legal
frameworks.
This paper will first consider the Declaration of
Principals, the treaty signed by representatives from Israel and the
Palestinians in May of 1993. Next, relevant portions of Occupier's
Law will be discussed in connection with its application in the
occupied territories. Finally, Human Rights law, including U.N.
resolutions, will be analyzed to determine what rights Palestinians

124.

RAJA SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER'S LAW: ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK 5 (1985).

125.

QUIGLEY, supra note 25, at 203.

126.

Id.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 204.
Id. at 203.
Id.
Id. at 204.
QUIGLEY, supranote 25, at 203.
Id.
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have in dispossessed property. This list is by no means exhaustive,

33

but provides effective frameworks with which property rights may be
further examined.
A. The Declarationof Principals
The most significant breakthrough in Israeli-Palestinian peace
negotiations took place in 1993 when representatives of both sides
signed the Declaration of Principals on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements (D.O.P.).13 4 The miracle of this agreement was that
parties moved beyond the destructive belief that either the Jews
should be pushed into the Sea or that Palestinians should "go home"
and live in other Arab countries. 135 Both parties acknowledged that
136
both parties have an identity and a right to national autonomy.
Building on the Camp David Framework, and adopting U.N. Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338, this agreement intended to pave the
way for both parties to:
put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize (each
others] mutual and legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in
peaceful co-existence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a
just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic
137
reconciliation through the agreed political process.
...

More specifically, the agreement called for a five-year plan
leading to an independent Palestinian state.138 This five-year period
was to begin with the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Gaza
Strip and Jericho areas.1 3 9 Permanent status negotiations were to
begin no later than three years after the beginning of the interim
period, or May 1996.140 A more extensive Interim Agreement was
written that fleshed out the procedures and details for the
generalities called for in the D.O.P. 141 Certain major issues, however,
were intentionally undecided, including: the status of Jerusalem,

133.
Id.
134.
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements,
September 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1525, 1534 [hereinafter D.O.P.].
135.
Id.
136.
Id.
137.
Id.
138.
Id.
139.
Id.
140.
D.O.P., supra note 134, at 1534. The final status negotiations did not
substantively begin until September 1999. Wilkinson, supra note 3, at Al. 'Two
previous attempts to begin negotiations on these outstanding so-called final-status
issues went nowhere, in part because of the ascension to power in May 1996 of hardline Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu." Id.
141.
D.O.P., supranote 134.
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refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations with
142
other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.
For the purposes of the D.O.P., the West Bank and Gaza Strip
were considered one territorial unit. 14 3 The agreement allowed for
the Palestinians to elect a governing Council to replace the
Once elected, this
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).
Council was to receive authority in Jericho and the Gaza Strip over
education, culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism,
and the development of a police force. 14 4 The interim agreement
called for the same measures to be taken in the West Bank, but in
stages. 14 5 Eventually, the Council was to have jurisdiction in all
matters in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, except for those matters
that would be negotiated for in the permanent status negotiations. 146
The D.O.P. specifically reserved the issue of resolving private
property conflicts for the dispossessed for permanent status
negotiations. 147 The D.O.P. provides no framework for deciding what
is to be done with private property, except stipulating that any
solution must be acquired through negotiations. 148
The D.O.P.,
however, specifically adopted U.N. Security Council Resolutions 338
and 242.149 Resolution 338, in relevant part, "calls upon" all parties
to cease fire, "calls upon" all parties concerned to implement Security
Council Resolution 242, and "decides" that negotiation shall be
"aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle
East."'150 Resolution 242 affirmed the necessity "for achieving a just
settlement of the refugee problem.' 151 These resolutions merely state
that the solution must be just and must contribute to an enduring
152
peace.
Today, eight years after the D.O.P. was signed, much of the
interim agreement has been carried out. 153 Unfortunately, both

142.
Id. Art. V, no. 3.
143.
Id. Art. IV.
144.
Id. Art. VI, no. 2.
145.
See id.; see also Rotem M. Giladi, The Practice and Case Law of Israel in
MattersRelated to InternationalLaw, 29 ISR. L. REV. 506, 521 (1995).
146.
D.O.P., supra note 134, Art. VI, no. 2; see also Giladi, supra note 145, at
521.
147.
D.O.P., supra note 134.
148.
Id.
149.
Id. Art. I.
150.
G.A. Res. 338, U.N. SCOR, 22nd Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (1967),
reprinted in

RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY

COUNCIL (1946-1989) 462 (Karel C. Wellens ed., 1991).
151.
G.A. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR, 22nd Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (1967),
reprinted in

RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY

COUNCIL (1946-1989) 462 (Karel C. Wellens ed., 1991).
152.
Res. 338, supra note 150.
153.
Wilkinson, supra note 3, at A8.
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54
parties have failed to complete permanent status negotiations.
May of 1996 came and went without any permanent status
negotiatioris. 155 Likewise, the revised deadline for an outline for the
final status negotiations, the February 13, 2000 deadline passed by
without any progress. 15 6 PLO leader Yasser Arafat had promised to
declare the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on
September 31, 2000,157 but this date also passed.'5 8 The timetable
for peace in the Middle East seems elusive at best, and given the
current violence, non-existent at worst.
The D.O.P. and related U.N. documents do not settle the issue of
what should be done with private property in Israel and the Occupied
Although not particularly instructive, these
Territories. 159
d6cuments do make clear that private property is an important issue
to be settled and provide a basic fiamework within which
160
negotiations can take place.

B. Occupier'sLaw and Its Application in the Occupied Territories

1. Overview of Occupier's Law
Occupier's Law is included within the law of war, which is one of
the oldest bodies of modern international law. 161 The law of war was
first promulgated by custom and usage among military personnel,
declarations by individual governments, private conferences, and
academic codes. 162 Since the mid-nineteenth century, however, the
laws of war have become more specific and binding through the use of
63
international agreements and conferences.
The most important rules of war were defined at the two peace
conferences at Hague in 1899 and 1907.164 The more recent and

154.

Id.

155.

Id.

156.
World Wide, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2000 at Al.
Wilkinson, supra note 3, at Al.
157.
158.
Danny Rubinstein, Troubles in His Own Back Yard: Alongside the Crisis in
the Talks Between Israel and the Palestinians,the Rift Between Yasser Arafat and the
Leadership of the Palestinian Authority is Deepening, HA'ARETZ DAILY NEWSPAPER
(TELAVIV), Feb. 7, 2000, 2800 WL 7217755.
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
159.
160.
See supra text accompanying notes 121-24.
GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENE2,y TERRITORY ... A
161.
COMMENTARY ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 3 (1957).

162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id.
Gerhard von Glahn states:

[t]he 1899 Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land
laid the basis for most of the principals currently guiding armies in the lawful
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complete convention regarding the law of war comes from the four
Geneva conventions of 1948, and the two additional Protocols of
1977.165 As of 1994, 185 states are parties to the four 1949 Geneva
Convention, including almost all U.N. member states. Additionally,
over 120 states are bound by the two 1977 Protocols. 16 6 The laws
described in this note are taken from these two sets of treaties
because of their broad International acceptance.
Occupier's Law provides a wide range of safety features for the
populations of occupied territories, yet it also strives to leave the
67
occupying state with enough flexibility to maintain its dominance.
Occupier's Law, as provided by the Hague and Geneva Conventions,
can be summarized into four key points. 168 The first comes from
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and states that the occupant's
power is of a de facto nature. 169 Military occupation does not give

occupation of enemy territory. The later (1907) Fourth Convention Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annexed Regulations,
particularly Articles 23g, 23h, and 42-56, embodied the rules which have been
adopted officially by most nations of the world into their military manuals.
VON GLAHN, supra note 161, at 9.
165.
TAKKENBERG, supra note 83, at 199.
166.
Id.
167.
Id. at 202. Roberts summarizes the purpose behind the law of occupation
into eight points:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.

8.

Ensuring that those who are in the hands of an adversary are
treated with humanity.
Harmonizing these humanitarian interests with the military
needs of the occupant.
Preventing the imposition of disruptive changes in the occupied
territory, and preserving the rights of the sovereign there.
Preserving military discipline among the occupying forces.
Reducing the risk that relations between occupant and occupied
will get out of hand and lead to renewed conflict.
Improving the chances that, if an occupant finds part of its own
territory occupied, its population will in turn be treated with due
regard to international norms.
Helping to maintain friendly relations between the occupying
power and foreign states-whether allies, adversaries, or
neutrals.
Facilitating the prospects for an eventual peace agreement.

Id. (citing A. Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories
1967-1988, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES 25, 27 (E. Playfair, ed. 1992)).
168.
Id. at 202 (citing C., Greenwood, The Administration of Occupied Territory
in InternationalLaw, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES 25, 27 (E. Playfair ed., 1992)).
169.
Id. Article 43 reads: '"The authority of the legitimate power having in fact
passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his
power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." Id.
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sovereignty to the occupying power. 170
The occupier has only
temporary and de facto authority, subject to various limitations,
which should only be used to protect its security interests. 71 One
implication of this principal is that the occupying power may not
bring in its own population and must leave the existing population in
72
the occupied territory as it finds it.
A second principal is that the occupying power is required to
administer the territory it occupies.' 73
The Fourth Geneva
Convention imposes specific obligations including: education, 74 food
and medical supplies, 175 maintenance of medical hospitals, 176 and
relief efforts where needed. 177 The occupying power may also take
measures which are necessary to protect its armed forces and
178
preserve its military position.
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations gives a third principal:
"unless absolutely prevented," the occupying power has a duty to
respect existing law.' 7 9 The rationale is that international law does
not recognize the legislative confidence of the occupying power,
consequently, existing laws should not be changed unless absolutely
required for the needs of the occupation. 80
The final principal, found in the Fourth Geneva Convention,
places specific requirements on the occupant to provide a minimum
level of humanitarian protection for the existing population.' 8 ' These
minimum standards include the prohibition of collective punishment,
hostage taking, torture, deportation, slave labor, wholesale seizure of
property, and forcing individuals to perform work assisting the
82
military.'
Specifically regarding immovable property of the enemy, Article
55 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 states:
The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and

usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural
estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied

170.

Id. at 203.

171.

W. THOMAS MAiLLISON & SALLY MAULUSON, THE PALESTINE PROBLEM, IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 241 (1986).
172.
TAKKENBERG, supra note 83, at 204. Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention states that "[t]he Occupying Power shall not... transfer parts of its own
civilian population into the territories it occupies." Id.
173.
Id. at 204.
174.
Id. at Art. 50.
175.
Id. at Art. 55.
176.
Id. at Art. 56.
177.
Id. at Art. 59-62.
178.
TAKKENBERG, supra note 83, at 204.
179.
Id.
180. Id.
181.
Id. at 204-05.

182.

Id. at 205.
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territory. It must safe guard the capital of these properties and
183
administer them according to the rules of usufruct.

One of the clearest features of Occupier's Law is that the occupying
184
power has no authority to disturb private property rights.
From this general overview of the international law of
occupation, this note will examine how Occupier's Law has
manifested itself in the Israeli-occupied territories. Although the
Palestinians are slowly gaining autonomy, until the final status
negotiations are complete, the West Bank and Gaza Strip are
85
residually controlled by the Israeli military government.
186
Therefore, Occupier's Law governs the occupied territories.
In fact,
the Israeli Military Government has governed the occupied territories
since 1967.187
2. Predecessors to Occupier's Law in Israel
Three relevant time periods predate Israeli occupation of
Palestinian land. 18 8 Without an understanding of the governing law
in these periods, it is difficult to understand how Israeli control
altered the property rights of the Palestinians. 8 9 The relevant time
periods are: Ottoman rule (Pre 1920), rule under the British mandate
(1920-1948), and Jordanian rule (1948 to 1967).190
The governing land law in the West Bank' 91 is the Ottoman
Land Code (Land Code), as modified and developed by the British,
Jordanians, and Israeli Military Authority. 192 According to the Land
Code, all land within the West Bank falls into one of the following
three categories: (1) wakf lands, (2) mulk lands, and (3) miri,
matruke, or mawat lands. 193 Wakf lands are dedicated to pious
purposes, like charity and houses of worship. Mulk lands are private
property, which were given out by the Ottoman conquers of the

183.
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, reprinted in
VON GLAHN, supra note 161, app. 1, at 295.
184.
MALLISON & MALLISON, supra note 171, at 240. This does not apply to
state property. Id.
185.
Giladi, supra note 145, at 511.
186.
Id.
187.
1967 marks the Six Day War, where Israel captured the West Bank and
Gaza territories from Jordan and Egypt respectively. Most of the land taken from
Egypt in 1967 was given back in exchange for peace.
188.
See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text. This is because Occupier's
Law is not supposed to alter the previous law unless necessary. Id.
189.
Id.
190.
See supraPart II.
191.
Although this discussion focuses on the West Bank, the Gaza Strip has had
almost the same experience.
192.
SHEHADEH, supranote 124, at 23.
193.
Id.
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area. 194 As for the third category, the commonality between the three
types of land is that the Emir or Sultan had a residual right to the
land although he did not use it.195 Miri land is similar to a Lord's
land in the English feudal system. 196 Matruke land was given by the
197
Sultan for public purposes such as building roads, cemeteries, etc.
The third category, mawat land, was considered "dead land" because
it lay far from the village.198
All regimes until 1967 recognized the right of the village to use
the surrounding land for either a common pasture or future
development of the village. 199 The village inhabitants knew amongst
themselves what land was owned by each family and what land was
considered common.20° Therefore, they generally had no opportunity
20 1
or need to register their land.
The British mandate government introduced land registration to
Palestine, and the Jordanian government continued it. 202 Due to the

slow pace of the process, however, only about one-third of West
Bank's land was registered by 1967.203 After 1967, virtually no more
land was registered because Israeli military authorities stopped the
operation of the Settlement of Disputed Land Law by which land was
204
registered.
Under the Land Code there was no category for state or public
land.20 5 The British mandate government introduced this category

through the 1922 Order of Council. 20 6 Article 2 of this document
defined "public lands" as "all lands in Palestine which are subject to
the control of the government of Palestine by virtue of Treaty,
Convention, Agreement or Succession and all lands which are or shall
be acquired for the public service or otherwise."2 0 7 The Sultan's
position as ultimate theoretical owner was transferred to the High

194.
195.
196.
give out as

Id.
VrrrA, supra note 8, at 195.
SHEHADEH, supra note 124, at 23. Miri is the land that the Sultan hd not
mulk or dedicate to wakf Instead he would grant the land to people to use

under certain conditions. Id. When a Sultan would initially conquer a land he would
allow the conquered peoples to use some of the land as tenants. This land was mirs.
See VrrrA, supranote 8, at 195.
197. SHEHADEH, supranote 124, at 24.
198.
Id. The Land Code describes this land as further "than the human voice
could be heard." Id.
199.
Id.
200. Id.
201.
Id.
202.
SHEHADEH, supranote 124, at 24.
203.
Id.
204.
Id. at 23.
205.
Id. at 24.
206.
Id.
207.
Id. This definition consisted of land restricted to government use, and
included land taken by expropriation. Id. at 23-24.
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miri, matruke, or

vested
mawat lands).20 8 Accordingly, the High Commissioner was
20 9
with all rights of the public land as a trustee for Palestine.
Jordan also had laws that allowed the government to acquire
land for public or military purposes, but it was strictly limited.2 10
Article 11 of the Jordanian Constitution forbade expropriation of
private property for public benefit unless fair compensation was
paid. 211 It also required a statement of the intent to expropriate to be
published in a local newspaper, and gave the owner the right to
appeal the decision in the courts. 212 Jordanian law removed the
differences between miri and mulk lands, 213 declaring that all miri
(or Sultan's) lands falling in municipal areas were to be transferred
214
into mulk (private property) lands.
Only about thirteen percent of the land in the West Bank was
registered in the name of the state by 1967. Israeli Military rule,
however, made it easier and easier to declare land state land.2 15
Before 1993, Israel had taken about forty percent of the West
Bank.2 16
3. Occupier's Law in Israel
The Israeli-Palestinian manifestation of Occupier's Law affected
private property rights in several ways. 2 17 Initially, the law allowed
for the seizure of land from Palestinians for Military purposes only. 218

After 1979, with the rise in power of the Likud party, large tracks of

208.
SHEHADEH, supra note 124, at 25.
209.
Id. The courts during the British mandate did not interpret miri lands to
be state lands. Id. at 26.
210.
Id. at 25.
211.
RAJA SHEHADEH, THE WEST BANK AND THE RULE OF LAW 61 (1980)
[hereinafter SHEHADEH II].
212.
Id.
213.
SHEHADEH, supra note 124, at 24 (citing Jordanian law No. 49 of 1953).
214.
Id.
215.
See id. at 25-26.
216.
Id. at 5.
217.
It should be noted that in addition to the ways discussed below, a small

percentage of the land in the West Bank used for settlement was bought. SHEHADEH,
supra note 124, at 39. Most of this property was bought during the period of the
British mandate, and kept under the Jordanian Custodian of Enemy Property from
1948 to 1967. Id. Jordanian law severely restricted land sale to non-Jordanians (all
Palestinians in the West Bank are Jordanian citizens). Id. Sale could not be done
without permission of the Council of Ministers. Id. After 1979 the Military
Commander of the West Bank, assuming all the legislative and governmental powers
under Jordanian law, removed the restrictions on the purchase of land in the West
Bank by individual Jews. Id. The sale of land by Palestinians to Jews in the West
Bank, however, may be considered an act of treason by the community because it
contravenes the basic need of the Palestinians for their own state. Id. at 39-40.
218.
SHEHADEH, supra note 124, at 117.
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land were taken for state purposes.2 19 Additionally, policies were
220
enacted to retain property left behind by refugees.

a. Acquisition of Land for Military Purposes and the Elon Mforeh Case
Possession of land taken for military purposes resides in the
occupier, but ownership remains in the original landowner.2 2 1 From
the beginning of occupation to 1979, the most common way for the
Israeli government to acquire land in the West Bank was through
requisition for military purposes. 222 After 1979, political changes in
the Israeli government and the decision in the Elon Moreh case
22 3
changed the rate and method by which land was expropriated.
The facts of the Elon Moreh case are as follows. Israel's
Ministerial Settlement Committee decided to find land to settle the
Elon Moreh nucleus of Israeli citizens.22 4 It tried to find land in the
West Bank that was not privately owned, but was not successful .2
The Committee found privately owned land and sought to appropriate
it through the military under the guise of military security.22 6 On
June 7, 1979, Mustafa Duweikat and sixteen other land owners in the
village of Rujeib were surprised when they found settlement
operations taking place on their land.2 2 7 Three days later the village
elders were told of the appropriations and informed to pass the word
228
along to the landowners.

219.
See id. at 27.
220.
Id. at 34.
221.
Id. at 37.
222.
Id. at 17. The progression took place as follows: In accordance with United
Nations Security Council resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, Israel began annexing
areas in East Jerusalem and along the Jordan rift to establish more secure boundaries.
TAKKENBERG, supra note 83, at 221. In 1977 the more conservative Likud party ousted
the Labor party, and began to create settlements in the West Bank according to their
belief that the West Bank belonged to Israel as part of the ancient Hebrew Kingdom.
Id. Military Orders have declared some areas in the West Bank to be "closed" areas.
See SHEHADEH, supra note 124, at 37. These lands are requisitioned on the grounds
that they are "security zones" needed by the Israeli military for training grounds and
firing ranges. Id. Restricted Military areas cover about 1.11 million dunumms of
seized territory in the West Bank (or 1.11 billion sq. meters, about fifty-three percent of
taken land in the West Bank). Id.
223. Id. at 18-22.
224. Id. at 19.
225. Id.
226. SHEHADEH, supra note 124, at 19. The requisition was approved, the
Military Order stating "on the basis of my authority, as Commander of the area and
being of the opinion that the measure is required for security needs, I hereby
command..." Id.

227.
228.

Id. at 20.
Id. at 18-20.
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Mustafa Duweikat and the others appealed to the Israeli High
Court challenging the military necessity of the seizure. 229 The Elon
Moreh Jewish settlers did not rely on the militaristic justification for
taking land, instead claiming a right to the land based on ideological
and religious grounds. 230 Israeli Justice Landau decided that the
land was being taken for reasons stemming from the Zionist
worldview, not military security. 23 1 Furthermore, he saw an
insurmountable legal obstacle in taking possession of land for
permanent settlement without confiscating ownership. 232 Ultimately,
the court ruled that international law prohibits the taking of private
property. 233 The court also implied, however, that if the property
2 34
seized was not privateproperty, then it would hold differently.
In order to take land after the Elon Moreh case, military
authorities had to find property that was not private property, and
235
create a tribunal to settle disputes over the ownership of land.

Although at first blush this ruling seemed to be a victory for
Palestinians, its execution robbed many of any hope of maintaining
their property rights.2 36 Before the Elon Moreh case, land ownership
was conclusively determined and settled in the land registry through
a court. 237 By 1967, only about one-third of the titles had been settled

and registered, leaving two-thirds of the land in the West Bank
officially in dispute. 236 Under Military Order No. 291, individuals
who wanted to prove title had to do so by oral testimony, purchase
agreements, tax receipts and other forms of inconclusive evidence.2 39
If the Arab landowner could not meet this high burden, he would lose
24
his land.

0

229.
Id. at 20.
230.
Id.
SHEHADEH, supra note 124, at 20.
231.
232.
Id. at 21. Israel only obtained possession of lands taken for military
purposes, not title, which remained in the original landowner. Id. at 37.
233.
Id. at 21.
234.
Id. The court imposed two limitations on cases of land seizures for military

purposes:
1)
2)

Only seizures of privately owned land could be prevented or
reversed by recourse to the High Court, and
The High Court was not prepared to intervene in any disputes
over ownership status in land.

Id.
235.
SHEHADEH, supra note 124, at 21. The Elon Moreh settlement was later
built on "state" land. Id. at 22. For a more detailed look at the Elon Moreh case, see
SHEHADEH, supranote 124, at 18-22.
236.
See id. at 22-23.
237.
See id. at 22.
238.
Id.
239.
SHEHADEH II, supra note 211, at 61.
240.
Id. at 62.
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b. Declaring Land State Land for Acquisition Purposes
In 1979, the newly empowered Likud government was seeking
land for their plans of Jewish settlement in the West Bank. 241
Palestinian employees of the Survey Department, the Land
department, and the Office of Custodian and Absentee Property
conducted a through survey and found that most of the land in the
West Bank was not registered and was miri, matruke, or mawat
lands. 242 Going against the British and Jordanian policies predating
Israeli rule, the Israeli government decided to deem the land in these
243
three categories state land.

The most common means by which land in the West Bank was
acquired for settlement began when the Ministerial Settlement
Committee decided to establish a new settlement in the West Bank,
or enlarge an existing one. 244
After going through several
organizations for approval, the Custodian of Absentee and State
Lands pointed out the land that would be declared state land to the
mukhtar (village elder).245 The mukhtar then had the responsibility
to tell anyone who he thought owned plots within that area.2 4 6 The
landowners were told that they could appeal to the Military Objection
Committee (the Committee). 24 7 Due to the vague identifications of
the land to be taken, and the fact that many villagers were not on
good terms with the mukhtar, who was often appointed by the

241.
242.
243.

SHEHADEH, supranote 124, at 27-28.
Id. at 28.
Id. The justification for this policy is found in Military Order No. 59,

promulgated in 1967. Id. at 27-28.
243. Id. The order defines "state property" as:
(i)

All property which on the specified date (i.e., 6 June 1967)
pertained to one of the following(a)
the enemy state;
(b)
a juridical body in which the enemy state possessed any
right, whether directly or indirectly, and whether this
right referred to control or not;
(ii) Property which was registered on the specified day in the name of
one of the above two;
(iii) Property in which one of the above two was a partner on the
specified date;
(iv) Property which on the specified date was one of the two
mentioned in (i) above was either an owner in partnership, a
registered owner, or was in possession.

Id. at26.
This definition was taken to include all property that could not be conclusively
proven to be private property. Id. at 27.
244. SHEHADEH, supra note 124, at 28-29.
245. Id. at 29.
246.
Id.
247. Id.
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military authorities, the first sign that one's land would be taken was
248
often a bulldozer plowing up privately-owned property.
If a Palestinian landowner wanted to appeal the seizure of his
land, the first step was to find out the exact location of the area in
question. 249 The appellant had the burden of proving that the land
was not state land.250 Within forty-five days of receiving notice that
the land would be taken, the appellant had to submit a survey map of
the whole area prepared by a licensed surveyor and a sworn
statement declaring the basis upon which ownership was based,
accompanied by all documents on which the appellant based his
claim. 251 The appellant could not use receipts for tax payments or
registration with the tax department as proof of ownership, and it
2 52
was extremely difficult to prove ownership by use.
The Committee could order an injunction against development
until the appeal process was complete, but this did not happen in
practice. 253
Palestinians feared the near completion of the
settlements as the appeals process continued prejudiced the
outcome. 254 This fear was well-founded because even if the appellant
met the high standard of proof required, Military Order No. 59 article
5 provided that:
[E]very transaction made in good faith between the Custodian and
another person concerning property which the Custodian considered, at
the time of making the transaction, to be state property, shall not be
cancelled and shall continue to be binding even if it is proven that the

248.
Id. Under Jordanian law, Palestinian land owners had notice, appeal, and
compensation rights. SHEHADEH II, supra note 211, at 61. Under Israeli Military
authority, however, there is little to no notice requirement, and any right to appeal or
compensation is limited to the will of the Objections Committee alone. SHEHADEH,
supranote 124, at 38. Furthermore, there are severe punishments for those who refuse
to vacate their property-five years imprisonment, a heavy fine, or both. Id.
Expropriation law has been used to obtain land for settlements and for roads to lead to
settlements. Id.
249.
Id.
250.
Id. at 30.
251.
Id. Claims are often over land the size of two square miles, so the expense
of surveying is very high. Id.
252.
SHEHADEH, supranote 124, at 31.
The custodian has available to him the aerial photographs of the West Bank,
which have been taken periodically.
These are often presented to the
Committee as proof that the land has not been continuously cultivated. As the
authorities have refused to grant permits to Palestinian farmers for the drilling
of artesian wells, agriculture, in most cases, is dependent upon the irregular
and often insufficient rainwater.
Id.
253.
254.

Id. at 30.
Id.
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property in question was not state property at the time when the
255
transaction was made.

The high burden of proof and the great expense of fighting land
takings ensured that appeals to the Committee would yield a low
25 6
success rate.
c. Absentee Property
Military Order No. 58 governed what was to be done with
absentee property in the Occupied Territories. 257 This order defined
an "absentee" as anyone who left the area of the West Bank before,
on, or after June 7, 1967.258 The Order called for the appointment of
a Custodian who was to hold the property in trust for the absentee
until his return. 259 The Custodian's approval was needed to transfer
immovable property. 260 The justification for this rule was to enable
the Custodian to discover who the absentee owners were. 26 1 Today,
over thirty years later, the absentee owners are known but the rule
262
stays in place.
Military Order No. 58 differs from its predecessor, the Israeli
Absentee Property Law of 1951, in its broader definition of
"absentee."263 The previous definition included persons that on
certain dates were in an Arab country with which Israel was at war.
Military Order No. 58, however, only considered whether the person
had left the country, without considering where the absentee was, or
26 4
that person's status within the country which they lived.
Immigration between the West Bank and other countries has always
been substantial, but under this definition of "absentee," a person
leaving the West Bank even temporarily had the potential of
becoming an "absentee."2 65
Israeli Military law regarding absentees essentially allowed the
Custodian to use absentee property with a freedom equivalent to

255.
256.

Id. at 31.
Id. The expenses involved, including payment for professional services of

the surveyor and lawyer, are often much higher that those an average villager in the
West Bank can afford. Id.
257.
SHEHADEH II, supranote 211, at 59.
258.
Id.
259.
Id.
260.
Id.
261. Id.
262.
Id. at 59-60.
263.
SHEHADEH II, supranote 211, at 60.
264. Id.
265. Id. This strict definition is usually not applied to residents of friendly
countries, but there have been occasions where Palestinians holding American
passports were not allowed to transfer land because they were considered absentees.
Id. at 61.
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absolute ownership. 266 The law allowed the custodian to transfer the
land to the "Development Authority. '26 7 The property could not be
sold or transferred, so it was instead utilized through long-term
leases. 268 When some owners returned to claim their land, legally
ceasing to be absentees, they were offered only nominal compensation
269
for land that had already been disposed of.
About forty percent of the land in the West Bank has been
expropriated, often in one of the manners described above.27 0 Some of
this land was used for military purposes, but most of it was used for
Jewish settlements. 27 1
Today, over 180,000 Israelis live in
272
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
C. Human Rights Law
Many comment on human rights in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip without reference to Israeli occupation policy.2 7 3 This omission
suggests an acceptance of the occupation framework laid down by the
Israeli Military.27 4 Human rights law, however, can complement
Occupier's Law. 275 In fact, the U.N. General Assembly, along with its
Secretary General, has stated that human rights instruments are
276
applicable to occupations.
Human rights law can be seen as moving beyond generalized
rules for "occupied populations,' ''stateless persons," and "refugees,"
and instead focusing on both the Palestinian individual and the
Palestinian people.27 7 Specifically, many consider it customary
international law that the individuals have a right to return to their

266.
Id.
267.
Id.
268.
Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 5, at 300.
269.
SHEHADEH II, supra note 211, at 61. One such scheme was the 1973
Absentees' Property (Compensation) Law, which was enacted for the purpose of
compensating Palestinian absentees of property in East Jerusalem. Benvenisti &
Zamir, supra note 5, at 300. The law turned many of the abstentee Palestinians living
in East Jerusalem into residents. Id. Then the law allowed compensation for Israeli
"residents" who's property was in the Custodian of Absentees' Property. Id. The
compensation offered, however, was not considered adequate, so few absentees used
this right. Id.
270.
SHEHADEH, supra note 124, at 5.
271.
SHEHADEH II,supra note 211, at 61.
272.
See Wilkinson, supra note 3, at Al.
273.
Eyal Benvenisti, The Applicability of Human Rights Conventions to Israel
and to the Occupied Territories, 26 ISR. L. REV. 24, 30 (1992) [hereinafter Benvenisti

II].
274.
SHEHADEH, supra note 124, at 106.
275.
See Benvenisti II, supra note 273, at 30.
276.
Id. at 28. "Some claim that when armed conflict erupts, most 'peacetime'
human rights are temporarily superceded by the humanitarian laws of war, which
alone determine the rights of the occupied population." Id.
277.
TAKKENBERG, supra note 83, at 229.
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homeland. 278 All four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions suggest that
people protected by the conventions are guaranteed a right of return
(or repatriation). 279 The right to return is in most if not all modern
28 0
human rights instruments.
1. The Right to Return and Compensation Before 1967
Specific international law regarding Palestinian rights to
property can be found in U.N. documents as early as 1948.281 A
progress report to the United Nations from U.N. Mediator for
Palestine, Count Folke Bernadotte, recommended:
The right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes in Jewish
controlled territory at the earliest possible date should be affirmed by
the United Nations, and their repatriation, resettlement and economic
and social rehabilitation, and payment of adequate compensation for
the property of those choosing not to return, should be supervised and
assisted by the United Nations Conciliation Commission .... 282

The use of the word "affirmed" instead of "established" suggests that
Count Bernadotte believed that international law already provided
28 3
refugees with the right to return to their homes.
The U.N. General Assembly accepted his recommendations by
adopting Resolution 194.284 This resolution contains a plan to deal
with the on-going conflict in Palestine and established a Conciliation
Commission for Palestine. 28 5 Paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 deals
specifically with property left behind, taken or destroyed, and reads:
the General Assembly...
Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at
peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest
practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for property of
those choosing not to return and for the loss of or damage to property
which, under principals of international law or in equity, should be
made good by the governments or authorities responsible.
Instructs the Conciliation of compensation, and to maintain close
relations with the Director of the United Nations and Works Agency for

278. Id. at 232. Most international treaties do not address specific private
property rights, but there is a right to leave and return to one's homeland. Id.
279. Id. at 232-33.
280. Id. at 234. Article 13 paragraph 2 of the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights states "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to
return to his country." Id.
281. TAKKENBERG, supranote 83, at 242.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 242-43. The day after he submitted this report Count Bernadotte
was assassinated by Jewish terrorists. Id. at 243.
284. TAKKENBERG, supra note 83, at 243.
285.
Id. at 243.
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Palestinian Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs
286
and agencies of the United Nations.

Several features of this resolution should be noted. First, return or
compensation is conditional upon "liv[ing] at peace with their
neighbors." 28 7 Initially the Arab world rejected Resolution 194
because they did not want to live in peace with a people they believed
had no right to be in Palestine. 2 88 Palestinians, however, soon
became Resolution 194's strongest supporters. 28 9 Second, returning
refugees are given a choice between returning to their homes or
receiving compensation. 290 This idea was reaffirmed in Resolution
513, adopted by the General Assembly in 1952, which endorsed both
this program and another proposed by the UNRWA. 2 91 Finally, the
resolution demands that this policy should be implemented "at the
earliest practicable date." 292 The creation of the State of Israel,
however, has made it increasingly impractical for Palestinians to ever
return to their homes. 293 Israel's Law of Return of 1959 and the
Nationality Law of 1952 gave all Jews a right to become Israeli
citizens, while denying this right to Palestinians that fled in 1948.294
The General Assembly annually reaffirmed Resolution 194 between
1952 and 1967, but the resolution's implementation became
295
increasingly impractical.

286.
Id. (quoting Paragraph 11 of United Nations General Assembly Resolution
194, promulgated in 1948). The United Nations accordingly created a three-member
Conciliation Commission consisting of Turkey, France, and the United States. John
Quigley, Displaced Palestiniansand a Right of Return, 39 HARV. INT'L L. J. 171, 183
(1998) (hereinafter Quigley II). The Conciliation Commission's job was to implement
Resolution 194. Id. Israel admitted 8,000 Palestinians on the basis of reuniting split
families, and offered to admit 100,000 more. Id. at 183-84. When the Commission
pushed for more, however, Israel withdrew the offer. Id. at 184. Frustrated, the
Commission reported that Israel's "attitude to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement
and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment toward [the
Palestinian] refugees is morally reprehensible . . . . Her position as conqueror
demanding more does not make for peace." Id. at 184.
287.
TAKKENBERG, supranote 83, at 243.
288.
Id. at 245 (discussing liberation theory, which is the idea that Palestinians
should possess Israel); see also As'ad 'Abd-al-Rahman, Resolution 194 Is a Compromise
Solution, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Dec. 23, 1999, 1999 WL 30771176.
289.
TAKKENBERG, supra note 83, at 244.
290.
Id.
291.
Id. at 243.
292.
Id. at 244.
293.
Id. at 245 (such as taking Arab land and moving in Israelis).
294.
Id. at 245-46.
295.
Id. at 246.
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2. The Right to Return and Compensation After 1967
Many Palestinians displaced by the 1948 war were again
2 96
displaced by the 1967 war, increasing the complexity of return.
The General Assembly dealt separately with the 1948 refugees and
the new 1967 displaced populations. 297 For example, Resolution
2452A of 1968, regarding the 1967 refugees, called for Israel "to take
effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of those
inhabitants who have fled the areas [occupied by Israel] since the
outbreak of hostilities."2 98 Resolution 2452B, concerning the 1948
refugees, continued the same policy of Resolution 194 regarding the
299
right of return.
In 1969, the General Assembly added to the right of return a
right for Palestinian self-determination. 30 0 Resolution 2535B of 1969
begins by stating "the problem of the Palestinian Arab refugees has
arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights under the Charter of
the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights."30 ' This resolution is the first to make reference to the
30 2
"people of Palestine."
Later resolutions, such as 2649 and 2672C, explicitly recognized
a right of Palestinian self-determination. 30 3 Resolution 3236 of 1974
is the first resolution to stop referring to Palestinians as refugees,
signifying that the Palestinian problem is one of people being denied
their national rights, not a refugee problem. 30 1 Also in 1974 a
resolution of the Palestinian National Committee (PNC) made two
important declarations. 30 5 The PNC first declared that the right to
return was "at the forefront" of Palestinian rights, and then declared
that Palestinian Arabs demanded a Palestinian state.3 0 6 The second
declaration suggested for the first time that the PNC was advocating
a Palestinian state in only part of Palestine,
allowing the possibility
30 7
of peaceful co-existence with Israel.

296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
state.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

TAKKENBERG, supra note 83, at 246.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 247.
Id.
Id. It is psychologically important to be acknowledged as a people with a
TAKKENBERG, supra note 83, at 247.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 248-49.
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IV. FINDING AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION
In the emerging nation of Palestine, secure property rights have
yet to be established. Aid agencies continue to imagine that cash
transfers solve economic problems, when all they do is empower
heads of state. 30 8 Property has long been insecure in the Arab world,
and if this is not corrected in a Palestine-to-be, the restless energies
of its many unemployed young men will seek an outlet in war with
30 9
the more prosperous neighbors.
The final settlement will be a product of compromise, with many
factors coming into play as each party lays their cards out on the
table. Many of the relevant factors are beyond the scope of this
note. 310 What this note is discussing is the legal rights of individual
Palestinians, whether refugees, displaced persons, foreign residents
or other, concerning their private real property, whether that be
property in the occupied territories, Israel proper, or elsewhere.
The analysis in the following section will proceed by addressing
four issues: (1) what both parties in this conflict have to gain and
lose from a final property settlement; (2) what legal rights the
Palestinians have to repossess their land; (3) how practical is the
exercise of these rights; and (4) what kind of compensation is
appropriate.
A. Policy Issues-What the PartiesHave to Gain and Lose
1. What Do the Israelis Have to Gain and Lose?
Before seriously considering the right of Palestinians to return to
their land, the Israelis have several urgent concerns. The first is an
existential security issue. 311 The Israelis are worried about changing

308.

Bethell, supranote 1.

309.

Id.

310.
Some of these are (1) Jewish property left in Arab Countries, (2) the final
status of Jerusalem, (3) water rights, (4) the refugee problem, (5) Jewish settlements in

the West Bank, (6) reparations and (7) borders. Property abandoned by Jews leaving
Arab countries will most likely play a part in the final settlement. Elli Wohlgelernter,
Playing the Property Card, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 29, 1999, 1999 WL 9009965. It is
the opinion of the author of this paper that Jewish repatriation or compensation is a
separate issue. Palestinians should not be a bargaining chip between Israel and Arab
countries. See TAKKENBERG, supra note 83, at 246. Due to the size of the refugee
problem, multiple solutions will have to be applied, and several countries will have to
absorb these people. For example Iraq intends to settle 500,000 and as a good faith
gesture has given Palestinian refugees the right to own property in Iraq. Nali 'Ali and
'Abbas al-Badri, Kurdish Sources: Iraq Preparing to Settle Palestinians In Karkuk,
WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Feb. 11, 2000, 2000 WL 13794851.
311.
Joseph Alpher et al., Concept Paper: The PalestinianRefugee Problem and
the Rights of Return, MIDDLE EAST POLICY, Feb. 1, 1999, at 15, 1999 WL 14924069.
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the Jewish character of the state of Israel. 312 If Palestinians were to
reclaim their land within the borders of Israel, the enormous amount
of land and people involved would substantially alter the
demographics in Israel.3 13 In fact, Israel would like to annex part of
the West Bank to maintain most of their settlements. 3 14
Israel is also concerned about accepting responsibility for the
refugee problem. 31 5 As stated before, there are two different
narratives about how and why the Palestinians left their homes in
the 1948 and 1967 wars.3 16 To accept the Palestinian narrative
317
would raise doubts about the legitimacy of the state of Israel.
Israel also wants peace, and knows that this cannot happen if
the refugee problem is not ameliorated. 318 They admit the existence
of the right to fair compensation, but want to link the Palestinian
right of fair compensation to compensation of Jews that were forced
to leave Arab countries to settle in Israel.3 19 They also want to
320
compensate on a collective and not an individual level.

2. What Do the Palestinians Have to Gain and Lose?
The refugee problem has come to signify the historical injustice
that has been done to the Palestinian people. 32 1 Palestinians want
Israel to recognize their share of guilt in creating the refugee problem
and to acknowledge a political and moral, if not actual, right to
return. 322 These admissions could provide a fertile basis for which
323
claims of compensation and reparations could be settled.
The Palestinians also want some sort of individual compensation
for taken property. 3

-4

This compensation should not necessarily be

monetary, and could instead take the form of new land and dwellings,
or some other physical means of bettering Palestinian life.
Palestinians also seek self-representation, not representation by
3
other Arab countries, or an international organization. 2

312.
Id.
313.
Id.
314.
Wilkinson, supra note 3, at Al.
315.
Alpher et al., supranote 311, at 15.
316.
See supranotes 103-06 and accompanying text.
317.
Alpher et al., supranote 311. at 15.
318.
Id.
319.
Id.; see also Wohlgelernter, supra note 310. This issue is beyond the scope
of this note.
320.
Alpher et al., supra note 311, at 15.
321.
Id. at 14.
322.
Id.
323.
Id.
324.
Id.
325.
Id. at 14-15.

152

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 34:117

Finally, like Israelis, Palestinians want continuous territory for
their own state. 326 Ideally, they want the borders that existed before
1967, with Jerusalem as the capital. 327 Palestinians expect to make
few territorial concessions because they will be expected to absorb
328
many of their refugees within these borders.
B. Do PalestiniansHave a Legal Right of Return to Their Homes?
The Palestinian "Right to Return" is so psychologically important
and pervasive in Palestinian culture that many say it is at the core of
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.3 29 Both Palestinians and Israelis are
bound by a belief that they have the right to settled their respective
diasporas in the Holy Land.33 0 This analysis focuses more specifically
on the legal rights of Palestinian landowners to repossess their land
in Israel and the occupied territories.
1. Occupier's Law

a. Does Occupier's Law Apply to Israel and the Occupied Territories?
Is Israel bound by the international norms on belligerent
occupation found in Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva
Convention? 331 The Hague Regulations are considered by Israel's
332
Supreme Court to be declaratory of customary International law.
Likewise, Israel is a contracting party to the Geneva conventions, so

326.
Id.
327.
Wilkinson, supranote 3, at Al.
328.
Alpher, supra note 311, at 15. For a more detailed illustration of what
Palestinians might realistically settle for in a final settlement, see Mohammad Fadhel,
Anti-corruption Manifesto Expresses Palestinians'Feeling, Says Abdelshafi, MIDEAST
MIRROR, Dec. 2, 1999, vol. 13-233, 1999 WL 10277560.
329.
Palestinian Paper Cites Statements by Refugees Committee Unattributed
Report from Nabulus, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Jan. 22, 2000, 2000 WL 10334224;
see also Weiner, supra note 99, at 1-2; Quigley II, supra note 286, at 171-72.
330.
Jews base this belief on the Hebrew tradition that places Jews in the Holy
Land over two thousand years ago, and Palestinians base their belief on the illegality
of being dispossessed.
331.
The international norms on belligerent occupation come from Articles 42-56
of the 1899/1907 Hague Regulations, and from the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.
See supra note 161-87 and accompanying text.
332.
Yoram Dinstein, The InternationalLegal Dimensions of the Arab.Israeli
Conflict (citing Yoram Dinstein, The Application of Customary International Law
Concerning Armed Conflicts in the National Legal Order, in NATIONAL
IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 29, 31-33 (M. Bothe ed.,

1990).
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it too is fully binding. 333
33 4

Therefore, Occupier's Law applies to

Israel.
Do these laws apply to Israel's occupation of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip?33 5 Some argue that the Fourth Geneva Convention's
Occupier's Laws do not apply to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
because these territories did not legally belong to another state before
the occupation. 3 36 According to Article 2 paragraph 2 of the Geneva
Conventions, certain provisions regarding occupied territory are only
applicable in the case of an armed conflict between two High
33 7
Contracting Parties.
Jordan, Egypt, and Israel are all High Contracting Parties, but
the West Bank and Gaza Strip were not necessarily part of these
States at the time of occupation. 338 Jordan annexed the West Bank
in 1950, but annexation was only recognized by Great Britain and
Pakistan. 39 The relationship between the West Bank and Jordan
seems to be ambiguous, and most accurately described as a
trusteeship.3 40 Egypt did not claim the Gaza Strip was part of its
territory, but instead openly administered it as a kind of trust. 34 1
Sovereignty over an occupied territory always remains vested in
the ousted sovereign.3 42 In other words, the Occupier's Law does not
transfer title but instead gives the occupying power a temporary right
of possession.3 43 The Israeli argument claims that because the West
Bank and Gaza Strip were not part of Jordan and Egypt respectively,
they had no ousted sovereign, so sovereignty vested in Israel. 344
The major flaw in this argument is that it assumes there was a
vacuum in title of this land between the end of the British Mandate
and 1967.34 5 There can be no vacuum in title, however, so one must
assume that sovereignty was conferred to the inhabitants of the
occupied territory. 346 Assuming, arguendo, that the Jordanian 1948

333. Id. at 151.
334. Id. at 151-52.
335. hIALLISON & MALLISON, supra note 171. at 253.
336.
Michael Bothe, Israeli Measures in Occupied Territories in the Light of
International Humanitarian Law, in THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE PALESTINIAN
PROBLEM WITH SPECIAL REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM 213 (Hans Kochler
ed., 1995).

337.
338.

Id.
Id. at 214.
Joseph H. H. Weiler, Israel, The Territoriesand InternatinalLaw: When

339.
Doves are Hawks, in ISRAEL AMONG THE NATIONS 381, 385 (Alfred E. KeUermann et al.,
eds., 1998).

340.

Id. at 385-88.

341.
342.
343.
344.

Bothe, supranote 336, at 214.
Weiler, supra note 339, at 386.
Dinstein, supranote 332, at 150.
Weiler, supra note 339, at 386-87.

345.
346.

Id. at 387.
Id.
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occupation and 1950 annexation were illegal, Jordan still became the
3 47
sovereign because it took over where the Mandate power left off.
The Palestinians allowed annexation, which combines Palestinian
sovereignty with that of Jordan. 348 Thus, the land was taken from a
High Contracting party, and should be returned.
Another argument for Jordanian sovereignty over Palestinian
territories is that although most countries did not formally recognize
annexation, the international community recognized annexation de
facto. 34 9 One manifestation of this view is the almost universal
condemnation by the United Nations of Israeli settlements in the
West Bank. 350
Even Israel itself demonstrated recognition of
Jordanian sovereignty in policy when it applied the Jordanian or
Egyptian legal systems in the two respective Palestinian
3 51
territories.
Regardless, the international community has rejected Israel's
352
argument that Occupier's Law does not apply to Palestinian land.
The ICRC and many legal writers have criticized Israel's
argument. 35 3 Article 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that
"[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure
respect for the present Convention in all circumstances." 35 4 '[I]n all
circumstances' is intended to include declared or undeclared war,
recognized or unrecognized state of war, partial or total occupation
with or without armed resistance, and even certain circumstances
when the occupied is not a contracting party.355 The Convention does
not require that the ousted power is the legitimate sovereign of the
territories lost.3 56 Therefore, Occupier's Law applies to Israel in
357
general and the occupied territories specifically.
b. Does Occupier's Law Confer a Right to Return?
Occupier's Law confers a right to return in three different ways.
First, it directly confers a right to return to those who were not with
their property when occupation began. 358 Another right to return to
one's property comes from the illegality of land takings. 3 59 For

347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

See id. at 384.
Id.
Id. at 387.
See TAKKENBERG, supra note 83, at 222.
See Dinstein, supra note 332, at 151.
See TAKKENBERG, supra note 83, at 212-214.
Id. at 214.
TAKKENBERG, supranote 83, at 214.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 212.
SHEHADEH, supranote 124, at 32-36.
Id. at 22.

20011

PALESTINIAN PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS

example, when land is taken from an owner illegally, the taking
should be void and the owner should have the right to repossess.3 60
Finally, some land takings under occupation took possession only,
with the title remaining in the owner.3 61 When the occupation is over
or the military need for the land is gone, the owner should be able to
36 2
reclaim possession.
Several propositions in Occupier's Law support the belief that
Palestinians who left their land in the 1948 war or afterwards have a
right to reclaim their land.36 3 First, the Hague Regulations require
3 4
the occupying power to respect the public life of the territories. 6
This requirement, when coupled with the international norm of
respecting the occupied population's private property rights,
naturally leads to the proposition that those who left should be able
36 5
to return to their property.
Likewise, the 1949 Geneva Civilian Convention, which Israel is
party to, directly addresses the repatriation of absent nationals and
residents.36 6
The Convention requires the Occupying Power to
ensure the rights of "protected persons."36 7 It defines "protected
persons" as "those who, at a given moment and in any manner
whatsoever, find themselves ... in the hands of a[n] . . . Occupying
Power of which they are not nationals."36 8
As discussed previously, Palestinians have never actually been
allowed to return. After the 1948 war ended, Israel received great
international pressure to allow the refugees to return.36 9 In June of
1948, however, the Israeli government decided to bar return.3 7 0 Even
Palestinians that did not flee the territories could not reclaim their
property because they were considered 'Internal absentees." 3 7 1 Since
then, measures have been taken to make the return of refugees even
3 72
more difficult.
Illegal takings for settlements also confer upon Palestinians a
right to return to their property.37 3 Israel's policy of land acquisition

360.
Id. at 22-33.
361.
Id. at 37.
362.
Id. at 37.
363.
Quigley II, supra note 286, at 197.98.
364.
Id.
365.
.ALSON & MALLISON, supra note 171, at 241; see also Quigley II, supra
note 286, at 197-98.
366.
Quigley II, supranote 286, at 198.
367.
Id.
368.
Id.
369.
TAKKENBERG, supranote 83, at 16.
370.
Id.
371.
SHEHADEH, supranote 124, at 34.
372.
See supranotes 108, 113, 115, 259-60, 266-69 and accompanying text.
373.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, August 12, 1949, Article 49, reprinted in DOCUMETrS ON THE LAWs OF WAR
271, 288 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelffeds., 1989) [hereinafter Geneva Convention).
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in the occupied territories has mainly worked to promote Jewish
settlements.31 4 Land takings for settlements between 1967 and 1977
served a quasi-military purpose establishing new, more secure
boundaries. 375
After 1977, however, the Likud party began
increasing their taking of much larger tracts of land for settlements
on the basis that the West Bank belonged to Israel as part of the
3 76
ancient Hebrew kingdom.
Land taking for settlements was in violation of Article 49 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention, which states in relevant part: "[t]he
Occupying power shall not . . . transfer parts of its own civilian
The international
population into the territory it occupies. '377
community generally considers Israel's settlement activities to be
378
illegal under the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Finally, Palestinians have a right to reclaim their land because
Israel only had possessory rights in the land taken for "military
purposes." 379 Privately-owned land can be taken if it is needed for
"vital and immediate military requirements. '380 Assuming that there
was a true vital and immediate military purpose that required land
taking, 381 upon the end of occupation, possession should revert to the
Palestinian owners who theoretically never lost title. 382 Accordingly,
the land taken for settlements and other purposes under the guise of
"military necessity" should be returned to its true owners. 38 3
In all three of these categories, existing law disallowed the land
to be taken from the lawful possessor. 384 Israel has not respected the
crucial tenet of Occupier's Law that provides that the occupying

374.
George E. Bisharat, Land, Law, and Legitimacy in Israel and the Occupied
Territories, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 467, 530 (1994).
375.
Id. at 530-31; see also TAKKENBERG, supra note 83, at 221. This was in line
with the clause in Security Council resolution 242 recognizing Israel's right to secure
and recognize boundaries.
376.
Bisharat, supra note 374, at 532; see also TAKKENBERG, supra note 83, at
221.
377.
Geneva Convention, supra note 373, at 288.
378.
Wilkinson, supra note 3, at Al. The U.N. security council unanimously
adopted a resolution in 1980 that states: "Israel's policy and practices of settling parts
of its population and new immigrants in those territories constitute a flagrant violation
of the Fourth Geneva convention ...." TAKKENBERG, supra note 83, at 222. In 1982
the U.N. General Assembly stated that it "strongly condemns" this settlement practice
as a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Id.
379.
SHEHADEH, supra note 124, at 37.
380.
Id.
381.
Id. at 45. Shehadeh writes there are "sworn statements from Israeli
military personnel who argued that in fact civilian settlements in the West Bank would
be detrimental to security and in the event of war." Id.
382.
Id. at 37.
383.
Id.
384.
See supranotes 374, 378 and 380.
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power must respect existing law "unless absolutely prevented." 3
Occupier's Law supports the existence of the right of Palestinians to
reclaim their private property because Palestinians were
dispossessed of their property in contravention to Occupier's Law
allowing absentees to return, through illegal takings, and through
38 6
only temporary "military necessity."
2. Human Rights Law
a. Does Human Rights Law Bind Israel's Conduct in the Occupied
Territories?
The body of Human Rights law includes not only norms
contained in the Hague Resolutions and the Geneva Conventions, but
also other Conventions and documents promulgated by the United
Nations.387
Human Rights conventions usually define their own territorial
scope. This scope is typically related to either (1) the national
territory of the state party to the convention, or (2) the area under the
state party's jurisdiction. Either way, occupied territories of a party
to a convention fall within the definition. Consequently, Israel,
typically a party to these conventions, is bound to implement human
388
rights conventions in the occupied territories.
3 9
Israel has been a member of the United Nations since 1949. 8
Israel's U.N. membership was conditional on its acceptance of
Resolution 194.390 Israel accepted Resolution 194 when it joined the
391
United Nations, but has not complied with it to date.
b. Does Human Rights Law Confer a Right to Return?
i. Conventions
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that
"[e]veryone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and

385.
See supra text accompanying note 169. It is at least arguable that the
military orders that changed existing law were not "absolutely prevented." Land was
taken to enlarge the existing state of Israel, but not for the military needs of Israel or
for the maintenance of occupation. See supra text accompanying notes 181, 183, and
199.
386.
See generally SHEHADEH, supra note 124.
387.
These include General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions.
388.
Benvenisti II, supranote 273, at 33-35.
389.
See Issam Mufid Nashashibi, Israel Must Remember the Golden Rule, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 22, 1999, pg. B-9: 1, 7, 8; B-11:2; B-13:3.
390.
Id.
391.
Id.

158

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 34:117

to return to his country. ' 392 Many, if not all, modern Human Rights
treaties affirm this sentiment. 393
This statement, however, is
complicated when applied to Palestinians.
One must consider
whether Palestinians are exempt because they have no country, and
whether this right means that dispossessed landowners have the
394
right to return to their land.
First, the term "ones own country" can be read broadly to include
395
one's homeland or the state to which one has some connection.
Considering this issue, the International Court of Justice interpreted
"own country" in the Nottenbohm case. 396 There, the judge found that
links with a country rather than formal citizenship were decisive. 397
In his paper on the immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel, Knisbacher
applies the Nottenbohm court's findings in claiming that "tradition,
his establishment, his interests, his activities, his family ties, [and]
his intentions for the near future" are relevant in determining what
constitutes "ones own country. '398 Given this broad interpretation,
one can reasonably conclude that the Palestinian people have a right
to return to their land.
Does this right to return extend to a right to repossession of one's
property?
The wording of the main international instruments
regarding human rights do not seem to confer this specific right, but
3 99
other U.N. instruments do.
ii. General Assembly Resolution 194
U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 194, promulgated
December 11, 1948, directly deals with the right of Palestinians to
return to their homes and receive compensation. 40 0 Again, the text
states that the General Assembly:
Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at
peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest
practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for property of
those choosing not to return and for the loss of or damag2 to property
which, under principals of international law or in equity, should be
401
made good by the governments or authorities responsible.

392.
MALLISON & MALLISON, supra note 171, at 176.
393.
TAKKENBERG, supra note 83, at 234.
394.
Id.
395.
Id. at 236.
396.
Id. at 237.
397.
Id.
398.
Id.
399.
TAKKENBERG, supra note 83, at 243 (quoting Paragraph 11 of United
Nations General Assembly Resolution 194, promulgated in 1948).
400.
Id.
401.
Id.
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This resolution, read plainly, gives Palestinians a conditional right to
reclaim their property. 40 2 Some have claimed, however, that Israel's
position is consistent with Resolution 194 because of the resolution's
ambiguity. Five arguments have been put forward refuting the need
to comply with Resolution 194. They are: (1) Palestinian repatriation
is conditional on final settlement, (2) it only applies to Palestinians
who are willing to 'live in peace with their neighbors," (3) since
Resolution 194 does not give a specific date it does not confer a right,
(4) the resolution is couched in discretionary language, and (5)
subsequent U.N. actions demonstrate that they do not view
repatriation as a right. 40 3 All of these arguments can be refuted.
Repatriation was not meant to be contingent upon a final
settlement. 40 4 Implementation was supposed to be immediate, as
40 5
evidenced by the creation of the Conciliatory Commission.
Furthermore, when the resolution was being debated, the addition of
a clause proposed by Guatemala stating that repatriation would occur
"after the proclamation of peace by the contending parties in
Palestine, including the Arab states," was rejected. 406
Several
delegates were concerned that the Palestinians would be made pawns
401
in the negotiations for final settlement.
Resolution 194 applies to Palestinians wishing to "live at peace
with their neighbors." 40 8 Analysts that focus on the "live at peace"
language in Resolution 194 typically believe that only Israelis have
the right to judge whether and which Palestinians can live in peace
with Israelis. 40 9 This language, however, was not explained in the
debates surrounding the adoption of Resolution 194, so it is open for
interpretation. 4 10 Subsequent UNGA resolutions stating the same
message as Resolution 194 have omitted the "wishing to live in peace"
language, suggesting that Palestinians may return to their homes as
41
a matter of right. '

402.
See supranote 401.
403.
Quigley II, supranote 286, at 185.
404.
Id. at 186-87.
405.
Id. at 186-87. The Commission's purpose was to oversee the implementation of
Resolution 194.
406.
Id. at 186.
407.
Id. at 186.
408.
Id. at 187.
409.
QUIGLEY II, supranote 286, at 187.
410.
Id. One interpretation is that the language augments the "choice" part of
the resolution, suggesting that many might "choose" to live abroad and would accept
compensation rather than repossession.
411.
Id. One such resolution is Resolution 3236 which refers to -the inalienable
right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they have
been displaced and uprooted." Id.
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The resolution states that repossession shall take place at the
"earliest practicable date. '412 This language is consistent with the
approach the Conciliation Commission used and the mediation efforts
designed to get Israel to comply with the resolution. 4 13 The General
Assembly assumed that the logistics of repossession would take
time.4 14 During the negotiations, the term "possible" was replaced
with "practicable" partially because of the concerns the Israeli
415
delegates expressed that a return would create security problems.
When this change was made it was only made in the English text and
not in the French text, implying that the change was not significant
416
enough to warrant change in the French text.
Resolution 194 uses the prefix "should" in paragraph 11, however
the resolution's drafter called the provision a "precise directive. '417
Only Israel questioned repatriation as a right in the first committee
debate. 418 Regardless, subsequent resolutions have expressly stated
4 19
that Palestinian repossession is a right.
The United Nations continues to support Resolution 194 and the
right of the Palestinians to return. 420 Every year since 1948, the
United Nations has reaffirmed Resolution 194.421
The United
Nations also passed Resolution 513 regarding refugee resettlement in
Arab countries. 42 2
Resolution 513 is best interpreted as a
complement to Resolution 194.423 The U.N. Conciliatory Commission
reported that the longer refugees remained abroad, the greater the
chance that many of them would opt for compensation rather than

412.
413.
414.
415.

Id. at 188.
MALLISON & MALLISON, supra note 171, at 179-80.
Quigley II, supra note 286, at 188.
Id.

416.

Id.

417.
418.
419.

Id. at 188-89.
Id. at 189.
For example, General Assemble Resolution 3236 "[fr]eaffirm[ed] also the

inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which
they have been displaced and uprooted, and call[ed] for their return." Id. at 189.
Regarding other U.N. bodies, scholar John Quigley states:
Secretary-General U Thant said: "people everywhere, and this certainly applies
to Palestinian refugees, have a natural right to be in their homeland." The
United Nations Commission on Human Rights determined that human rights
norms required Israel to allow the displaced Palestinians to return. In a 1987
resolution, the Commission found a "right of the Palestinians to return to their
homeland Palestine and their property, from which they have been uprooted by
force." There would be little basis for concluding that the United Nations does
not view a Palestinian return as legally required.
Id. at 189-90.
420.
QUIGLEY II, supranote 286, at 192-93.
421.
Id. at 190.
422.
423.

Id.
Id.
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repossession. 424 Thus, Resolution 513 had the purpose of facilitating
4
the settlement of refugees choosing not to return to their homes. 2

Many subsequent resolutions cited for this argument contain the
phrase "without prejudice to provision 11 of General Assembly
Resolution 194," affirming rather than contradicting the U.N.
commitment to Resolution 194.426
Some see Resolution 242, which was accepted by both the PLO
and Israel as a basis for the final status negotiations, as an
abandonment of the right to return.4 27 Resolution 242 calls for a 'just
settlement. '428 Opponents of Resolution 194 argue that "just
settlement" cannot mean the plan called for in Resolution 194
because Israelis do not find it just.4 29

Resolution 242, however,

430
"Just
should be read in light of previous U.N. resolutions.
settlement' refers to the entire Middle East conflict, of which

repossession is merely a part.43 1 If this language means anything

specifically, 'just settlement" should be interpreted to affirm the
United Nations' consistent position that the Palestinians should have
a right to choose between compensation and repossession. 432 For
these reasons, U.N. Resolution 194 confers a right to the Palestinian
people to choose between compensation and repatriation.
Human Rights Law and Occupier's Law apply to Israel and the
Occupied Territories. 433 Each set of laws leads to the conclusion that
Palestinians have a right to return to their land.434 In many ways,
the Palestinian belief in their right to return is at the heart of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict.435 Therefore, it is imperative that Israel
acknowledges that the right to return exists, even if this means that
Israel admits that it has violated international law.
C. Will PalestiniansEver Exercise a Right to Return to Their Homes?
The amount of movable and immovable property that was
expropriated by Zionists in 1948 is shocking. Over eighty percent of
Israel's total area was previously Palestinian land.4 36 When it was

424.

425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
NEWSFILE,

Id. at 191.

Id. at 190-91.
Id. at 191.
D.O.P., supranote 134.
Resolution 242, supra note 151.
Quigley II, supra note 286, at 192.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 192-3.
See supra notes 332 and 389 and accompanying text.
See text accompanying notes 170-72, 393-95.
Alpher, supra note 311, at 14.
Fawaz Turki, The Thorniest Issue in Final Status Talks, MIDDLE EAST
Sept. 2, 1999, 1999 WL 9685731.
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taken, about a quarter of this land was being cultivated. 437 This
amounts to 4.5 billion square meters of cultivated land taken. The
Conciliatory Commission, established by Resolution 194, estimated in
1950 that the amount of cultivatable land taken from Palestinians in
1948 was about two-and-a-half times that of all land owned by Jews
438
at the end of the mandate.
Three hundred and fifty of the 370 settlements established
between 1948 and 1953 were founded on Palestinian absentee
land.439 By 1954, one-third of the Israeli population lived on absentee
Palestinian property. 440 About one-third of the 250,000 new Jewish
immigrants arriving in Israel in this same time period moved into
fully furnished homes in urban areas that had belonged to
441
Palestinians.
Palestinians left behind 338 entire towns and villages, including
Lydda, Ramleh, Jaffa, Acre, Baysan and Majdal. 442 Parts of ninetyfour other towns were also left behind. 44 3 Additionally, refugees left
10,000 shops and businesses, 120 million square meters of citrus
holdings, and vast olive groves. 444 As international scholar Don
Peretz stated in a paper delivered to an American think tank in
Washington: "It is questionable whether Israel would have been able
to bring in so many new immigrants so rapidly had it not taken over
''445
and used abandoned Arab property.
What would happen if all this property and the forty percent of
the West Bank that was taken by Israel after 1967 was
repossessed? 446 Repossession would result in the destruction of the
state of Israel. Given the mass quantities of land that could
potentially be repossessed, it is not surprising that former Israeli
Prime Minister Ehud Barak has taken the position that "there will be
'44 7
no return of the refugees to Israel, but the rest is negotiable.
Besides the sheer volume of land that could be repossessed, other
factors make the prospect of repossession unrealistic. These factors
include the difficulty in identifying property owners, 448 the need for

437.
Id.
438.
Id.
439.
Id.
440.
Id.
441.
Id.
442.
Id.
443.
Turki, supra note 436.
444.
Id.
445.
Id.
446.
SHEHADEH, supranote 124, at 5.
447.
Hisham Abdallah, Israeli-PalestinianPeace Talks Hit New Stumbling
Block Over Refugees, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Jan. 10, 2000, 2000 WL 2709964.
448.
Regarding the complexity in proving property title, Eyal Zamir and Eyal
Benvenisti write:
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territorial consistency, 449 and the maintenance of state character.45 0
It seems impractical to insist on repatriation for Palestinians
that have rights to property in Israel. This is not to say that
Palestinians should not exercise their rights to land in the occupied
territories, nor is it to say that limited repatriation should not be
allowed in order to reunite Palestinians with their families living in

Israel.45 1 This is also not to say that the Palestinian right to return
to their homes is wholly unfeasible. If total repatriation is not
possible in the scheme of a final peace settlement, then alternatives
must be explored.

D. Compensationfor Property and Compensation
for the Inability to Exercise a Right
45 2
Above all, U.N. Resolution 242 requires a just settlement.
Dislocating a large portion of the Israeli population would not be fair,
nor would it be fair to ignore the property rights that Palestinians
cannot exercise. Compensation is the natural alternative, but in
what form?
Perhaps the original solution proposed in U.N.
Resolution 194 can spark a compensation scheme that balances the
needs for territorial unity and individual rights.

...
in areas where there was no orderly system of registration and the
substantive provisions of the property law were archaic and complicated, as in
Palestine/Eretz Yisrael consisted of antiquated Ottoman legislation and a few
British ordinances. Needless to say, only a small number of Israelis and
Palestinians are familiar with the authoritative Turkish texts. Moreover, land
registration was very sparse, and the boundaries of those plots which were
registered during the Ottoman period (until 1917) were described only verbally,
without reference to maps. Therefore, those plots are very hard to locate.
Furthermore, local usage of land cultivation and rules of succession resulted in
joint ownership of large unregistered plots by several owners, each holding only
a fraction of the title.
Benvenisti & Zamir, supranote 5, at 337.
Considering that most of the land taken was taken over fifty years ago,
determining what belongs to whom will be a difficult but necessary task. Actual
repossession, as opposed to compensation, would require the determination of specific
boundaries as opposed to more generalized ownership rights.
This specific
determination would require an unimaginable amount of research and bureaucracy.
449. Additionally, if there will be separate states of Israel and Palestine, it is
illogical to have half of the Palestinian population in Israel. Furthermore, most of the
population of Israel would be displaced. Currently there are about 6.1 million Israelis
and 3.5 Palestinian refugees. See Samar Assad, Israel Rejects PalestinianDemand,
ASSOC. PRESS, Jan. 10, 2000, 2000 WL 3304851.
450. The demographic shift that Israel would sustain by absorbing all these
refugees would destroy its Jewish character, thus challenging the nature of the state
itself. See Alpher et al., supra note 311, at 15.
451. These topics are beyond the scope of this paper.
452. Resolution 242, supra note 151.
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Resolution 194 gives a choice to absentee landowners between
Resolution 194, first and
compensation and repossession. 453
foremost, affirms the right of the dispossessed to reclaim their
property. 454 In essence, the dispossessed either get compensation,
repossession, and a choice between the two. 45 5 Resolution 194 also
compensates (through money or repossession) on an individual
level.456 Finally, Resolution 194 acknowledges the right of the
individual Palestinian to exist as part of a state and to live in peace
4 57
with his neighbors.
These principals lay the foundation of a practical compensation
scheme where repossession is not possible. The Israeli government
can acknowledge the moral and political right of the dispossessed
45 8
Palestinians to return, if not the actual exercise of this right.
Palestinians must be compensated for this choice because the
dispossessed effectively lose the choice between compensation and
repossession.
Put another way, compensation to Palestinian
landowners must have a premium because they lose the choice to
repossess. Since compensation can also take place on an individual
level, the dispossessed should also have autonomy over the money
they receive for their land. 4 59 Finally, the Palestinian people can
have their own state, and must live in peace with their neighbor
Israel.
1. Acknowledgement of a Right to Return
As stated before, the Palestinian right of return is at the core of
the Middle Eastern conflict. 460 Many Palestinians have joined to
oppose Arafat's position in the negotiations because of his willingness
to forgo the right to return. 461 If actual repatriation is impossible,

453.
TAKKENBERG, supra note 83, at 243 (quoting Paragraph 11 of United
Nations General Assembly Resolution 194, promulgated in 1948).
454.
Id.
455.
Id.
456
See generally id.
457.
Id. at 244.
458.
One plan proposed by Palestinian negotiators suggested that the
recognition of the right to return would be enough. See Dana Budeiri, Arafat Makes
Peace Offer, ASSOC. PRESS, Jan. 26, 2000, 2000 WL 9751122.
459.
Alpher et al., supra note 311, at 14. Palestinians want to be compensated
on an individual, rather than a collective level. Id.
460.
Weiner, supranote 99, at 1.
461.
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then the least Israel can do is recognize, in principal, the right of the
462
Palestinians to return to their homes in what is now Israel.
The right to return is a political issue. 4 63
A diplomatic
concession by Israel that it is largely responsible for the refugee
problem, and that the nation was built on property that did not
belong to it, could lay the foundation upon which negotiations could
successfully continue. 4 64
A possible scenario may be that the
Palestinians give up their actual right to return to their homeland,
while Israel gains the assurance of Jewish sovereignty by making this
concession. 465
What Israel may lose, however, is a sense of
legitimacy. 466 An acknowledgement that the land belonged to the
Palestinians implicitly contradicts the Zionist notion that Palestine
was "a land without a people, for a people without a land."4 67 The
recognition of the Palestinians' right to return to their property,
however, is a small price to pay for the continued existence and
security of the Israeli nation.
2. Compensation for the Choice
The choice between compensation and repatriation was a
separate right granted to the Palestinians in Resolution 194.468 Since
Palestinians would not only give up the right to repatriation, but also
the right to choose repatriation, they should be compensated not only
for their property, but also for the right to choose.
This measure would give Palestinians the peace of mind that
Resolution 194 has been carried out, in some form. Although Israelis
see Resolution 194 as inflexible and extremist, Palestinians see it as a
compromise solution. 469 If this "compromise" solution, affirmed every
year by the United Nations, 470 is carried out, Israel saves face with
the international community. 47' Palestinians would simultaneously
get satisfaction in the implementation of Resolution 194.

462.
463.
464.

Budeiri, supra note 458.
Alpher et al., supra note 311, at 14.
Budeiri, supra note 458.

465.
Alpher et al., supra note 311, at 15. One of Israel's gravest concerns is that
the return of refugees would create a "fifth column" that would destroy the state's
Jewish character. See Abdallah, supranote 448, at 3.
466. See generally Alpher et al., supra note 311.
467.
See supranote 35 and accompanying text; see also Alpher et al., supra note
311, at 15.
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TAKKENBERG, supra note 83, at 243 (quoting Paragraph 11 of United
Nations General Assembly Resolution 194, promulgated in 1948).

469.
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471.
Resolution

'Abd-al-Rahman, supranote 288.
Nashashibi, supranote 389.
The international community has condemned Israel's refusal to implement
194. Quigley II, supra note 286, at 184.
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3. Individual Compensation for Property
While many have advocated collective compensation between the
two governments, Resolution 194 does not.4 72 Resolution 194 has
created an expectation that individuals will be compensated. 473 The
main advantage of collective compensation is ease, since only a single
figure must be negotiated. 474 Private property owners lose out,
however, because their individual rights are bartered without
consent. 475 Palestinians should not be made pawns in a final
476
settlement negotiation.
One writer compares the Palestinians' desire for individualized
compensation to the World Jewish Restitution Organization's efforts
to return Jewish owned property confiscated by Nazis and
Communist regimes. 477 He quotes Knesset speaker Avraham Burg,
stating, "What we are talking about is principal. We are not into the
price of business. What we want is that not one piece of property
which belonged to a Jew will remain in non-Jewish hands." 4 78
4. Living in Peace With Its Neighbors
Finally, and most importantly, regardless of which settlement is
decided upon, peace must exist between neighbors. Although the
nations visualized in Resolution 194 where Arabs and Jews live next
door to each other will probably not be realized in the near future,
both parties must act as good neighbors during the negotiations
process and beyond. If this peace materializes, the great sacrifices
necessary will be worth it.

V. CONCLUSIONS

This note has focused on the rights of Palestinian landowners to
reclaim their property in Israel and the Occupied Territories.
Without secure property rights, a new Palestinian state cannot exist.
Additionally, unless past injustices are rectified, the population of
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this Palestinian State will not be able to live in peace with its Israeli
neighbor.
The history of the region shows that no one people can own the
Holy Land. Since recorded history many have occupied this land, but
few have managed to retain a lasting control. The Ottomans held the
Holy Land for 500 years, but even this came to an end. Yet, because
the modern world has revalued the dignity of human life through law,
many Israelis have chosen not to act on what some feel is their
Biblical right to the occupied territories. Instead, in the name of
peace with their neighbors, and in compliance with international
policy, they have opted to make concessions.
This paper considered both Occupier's Law and Human Rights
law in Part III. Although Israel has complied with most of Occupier's
Law, there are several notable violations. Israel has taken property
in contravention to international law, and settled parts of its own
population in the occupied territories. Israel has also violated
Human Rights law by denying hundreds of thousands of Palestinians
return to their homeland. Finally, Israel has failed to comply with
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194, although their admission into
the United Nations was conditioned upon accepting this resolution.
Israel has had a hard time trying to create a state in a hostile
and volatile part of the world. Unfortunately, Israers success has led
to suffering and injustice for Palestinians. A lasting peace will
require concessions from both sides.
One solution that satisfies both law and equity is to implement
the principals embodied in U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194.
This would call for Israel to recognize, in principal, the Palestinians'
right to return to their homes. The refugees' choice in 194 should be
exchanged for a premium on the compensation they will receive for
their property. This compensation should be paid individually, and
not collectively. Finally, Palestinians must live in peace with Israel.
Implementation of a plan based on these principals would be a "just
settlement' as called for in U.N. Resolution 242.
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